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Preface
Since the Supreme Court decision in the case of Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City , 438 U.S. 104,
(1978), transfer of development rights has been utilized as
a means of preservation. The problem facing many urban
landmarks is that the economic pressures that control the
beat of a city are usually geared for new construction.
The new construction allows for the highest and best use of
the property. Older buildings of historic significance
are usually built at a density lower than that determined by
the municipality for the particular site. As such, they
are prime targets for demolition and redevelopment.
Transfer of development rights attempts to provide an
economic solution for the burdens of landmark designation.
It allows for the building to remain in private ownership by
providing the owner with some sort of relief for his
inability to redevelop the site for its highest and best
use. By allowing the private sector to provide economic
relief for the landmark owner, the municipality is saved
from purchasing the sites it wishes to preserve.
The transfer of development rights involves many
complex questions and issues as to its role in land use
legislation, constitutional law, and historic
preservation. This paper attempts to outline specific
questions concerning their issues and their use. The
purpose in writing this paper is to analyze a method of

historic preservation that thrusts what has become, over
time, a municipal duty, preserving our architectural
heritage, back into the realm of the private sector.
The paper starts with a summary of the historic
preservation movement in the United States starting with the
role of small, site-oriented groups. Particularly
important events are earmarked, such as the restoration/re-
creation of Williamsburg and the preservation ethic that
evolved from it, and the establishment of the National
Trust. It continues with an analysis of the legal issues
of property, land use, and preservation. Early cases such
as Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon , 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Village
of Euclid V. Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U.S. 365 (1926); and
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City are
cited. Recent Supreme Court decisions such as Nollan V.
California Coastal Commission , 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); and
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis , 107 S.
Ct. 1232 (1987); are utilized. The issue of transfer of
development rights as compensation is addressed, again
citing the Penn Central case, but also utilizing the Fred F.
French Investment Co. v. City of New York , 385 N.Y.S.2nd 5
(1976) case and the recent Supreme Court decision in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale y. County of
Los Angeles , 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). The transfer of
development rights is explained, followed by an analysis of
John J. Costonis's Chicago Plan. The program in New York
City is analyzed, reviewing three uses of the transfer of

development rights. The economics of transfer of
development rights is explored. The three types of
transfer of development rights systems are explained.
Issues involved in the transfer of rights are explored and
recommendations for
changes in the New York program are outlined.
The above mentioned issues are addressed by an analysis
of relevant writings regarding each particular issue.
Contrasting opinions are presented and conclusions
pertaining to the validity of each arguement are presented.
An examination of how these issues fit into both the Chicago
Plan and the New York City program is presented.

I . The Beginnings of Preservation
A. The Early Years
Journals, diaries, paintings, sculpture, architecture:
all of these things are records of man's achievements, his
hopes, his dreams, and sometimes his failures. They all
aid in our understanding of who we are as a nation and as a
culture. They are all similar, save one: architecture.
Architecture is around us every day. It does not have to
be sought out or confined to a vault. We move freely in
and around, enter and exit from buildings every day, more
than likely with very little thought about the important
role buildings play in our lives. Our built environment is
taken for granted.
We have certainly come to a consensus that for many,
architecture is taken for granted. Sadly this can be taken
as a blanket statement. Buildings of architectural and
cultural significance for the United States have been
ignored for many years. All but the most sacred have been
threatened with either significant alteration or demolition.
It is believed that up to one third of the buildings on the
Historic American Buildings Survey are now demolished. (1)
The trend in American has been to change, to demolish;
demolition was seen as a sign of progress. Happily not
everyone felt this way. Historic preservationists in the
United States have been fighting for almost 150 years to
raise the conscience of a nation. It has been our goal to

save those few remnants of our past. Preservation in the
United States started roughly and meekly as a band of women
gathered together to save the home of George Washington.
Today it is a multi-million dollar business (2) which
employs hundreds of men and women in every state in diverse
fields such as law, accounting, construction and academia.
The genesis of preservation is at once humble and
noble. The goal was to preserve Mount Vernon, the Virginia
home of George Washington. Guided by the determination of
Ann Pamela Cunningham, the Mount Vernon Ladies Association
was able to secure the title to the property before the
outbreak of the Civil War. (3)
This early venture was the start of the preservation
movement in the United States. From this we have the
growth of groups such as the Society for the Preservation of
New England Antiquities and the Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Foundation. The Thomas Jefferson group ultimately achieved
its objective to acquire title to Monticello. (4) Groups
such as the Daughters of the American Revolution and the
National Society of the Colonial Dames of the American
Revolution emulated the activities of the Mount Vernon
Ladies' Association. By the second decade of the twentieth
century, both groups were active vocal advocates of the
preservation of our architectural and historic heritage,
aiding groups in their task to preserve structures
throughout the United States. (5)

B. Williamsburg
The 1930s and 1940s were dominated by the legacy of
Williamsburg, Virginia. The Williamsburg
restoration/recreation can be considered a revolution for
the preservation movement. At no time before had any
preservation or restoration project influenced both the
preservation community and common citizens. Williamsburg
was to shape the future of preservation even to this decade.
Briefly, Williamsburg was the fusion of two important
elements: a clear vision and a bottomless source of
funding. Williamsburg was well endowed on both accounts.
The recreation of United States history, the attempt to
bring to life the spirit of the past, (6) was the brainchild
of Dr. William Archer Rutherford Goodwin. (7) By 1923, it
is believed that Goodwin had fully formulated his dream of
representing the entire lower peninsula of Virginia as the
birth place of the United States, with Williamsburg,
restored and rebuilt to reflect its eighteenth century
grandeur, as its spirited center. (8) By 1926, John D.
Rockefeller had become the backer for Goodwin's plans. (9)
By the fall of 1927, the colonial restoration of
Williamsburg had been widely reported in the newspaper and
magazines. Clearly, the " idea of carrying a whole city
back to its eighteenth century appearance caught the
imagination of the nation." (10)

C . Preservation in the 1960s
The Williamsburg philosophy was one of the most
persistent preservation ethics of our time. Its effects
reach into this decade. By the 1960s, the idea of
preservation had become fairly widespread. The destruction
of Pennsylvania Station, McKim, Mead, and White's 1913
masterpiece of the Beaux Arts, in 1961-2 was the last
straw. Such a significant loss combined with the populism
generated by Williamsburg, manifested itself in a federal
presence in the preservation field. The 1960s gave us the
National Historic Preservation Act in October of 1966, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and entering the
1970s, Executive Order 11593 of 1971. "What was once
termed the "Decade of Decision" (12) had become the "Decade
of Progress" (13) Preservation had become national policy,
an indication of its pervasiveness. But preservation had
also become a planning process that would determine how our
towns, cities and countryside would look. (14)
The change in preservation from a discipline that
insulated buildings from the realities of the world to one
that integrated the old with the new was a major step. No
longer would the museum be the final destination for the
preserved building. Our architectural heritage could be
preserved while it still contributed to our world. Ideas
such as adaptive use brought new uses into old buildings,

going so far as to alter the way americans perceive what is
acceptable as a home. We now live in factories, dance to
rock music in churches, view art in railroad stations.
Along with new planning, one finds new sources of profits.
While the Sixties may have been the decade of progress, the
Seventies were the decade of the dollar.

D. Preservation in the 1970s
Preservation was an economic venture, promoted by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. The Act fostered preservation by
the disallowal of deductions for the demolition of a
building; allowing accelerated depreciation of renovations
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and permitting
five year amortization of certain owner-incurred expenses.
(15) The Tax Reform Act was amended in 1980. The concept
of economic incentive was ushered into our decade.
As can be seen by the above genealogy, what started as
a move to "museumize ' some of our nation's historic
structures has become much less specific and static.
Preservation of buildings in the last quarter of the
twentieth century effectively stems from two diverse
sources: urban planning and economics. The issues inherent
in these two disciplines are now issues for preservation:
economic return, tax incentives, neighbourhood preservation,
urban renewal, open space, density. Economics and urban
planning combine to act as a form of preservation. The
transfer of development rights, usually a tool for the land
planner, is the key. Its dependence upon planning and
economics allows for the continual presence of many historic
buildings in one congested urban landscape.

II . Legal Aspects of Property, Preservation and the
Transfer of Development Rights
A. The importance of property
Christopher Duerksen stated that there "are over 1,000
local preservation ordinances; every state has at least some
preservation related laws; and there are more than a dozen
federal statutes and literally hundreds of pages in the Code
of Federal Regulations pertaining to preservation programs."
(16) A program such as one that deals with the transfer of a
historic landmark's unused development must comply with a
statutes and court decisions involving the legal use of
property and, by extension, landmark designation.
The basis of property law in the United States can be
traced through its links with English Common Law to the
Magna Carta. The Magna Carta was signed in 1215 by King
John I. It guaranteed certain fundamental rights to his
barons. One of those rights was the right to protect
property and prevent its unlawful seizure by the government
(i.e. the king) without some sort of payment for the loss to
the owner.
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B. The U.S. Constitution
Early colonial law was for the most part heard in
English courts so the English tradition of the sacred role
of property was slowly embodied in the awakening American
consciousness. After the colonies had won their
independence, the men who fought so hard for freedom set
about creating a government of laws, clearly defined yet
flexible enough to grow and change with its citizenry.
These men drew from the only source they truly knew--English
common law. The protection of one's property was
established in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution
;
"[No person shall] be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." (17)
The first half of the amendment provides for the protection
from unlawful seizure of property. Property can not be
taken without some sort of judicial procedure to ensure the
validity and legality of the claim. The second half
provides for fair compensation. This right of property is
protected against arbitrary state action in the Fourteenth
Amendment, section 1:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
11

United States: nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." (18)
Over the years, the Supreme Court of the United States and
the lower federal and state courts have upheld the rights of
private property. The Supreme Court's role as an
interpreter of the Constitution has allowed for a less
specific definition of the phrase "life, liberty, or
property." (19) The Court has decided over the years what
constitutes control of one's property.
C. Zoning
The decisions made by the Court that control or limit
the use of property by an individual have been for our
purposes in the realms of zoning, land control and
preservation. The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was
enacted in the City of New York in 1916 in response to the
completion of the Equitable Building in Wall Street. The
building rose over twenty stories, covering its entire lot.
The shadows produced by the building, some casting entire
streets in a mid-day darkness, alarmed people so much that
the City passed a zoning resolution which called for
setbacks in a building's facade at prescribed heights.
This zoning resolution produced the wonderful jazz-age
12

buildings that for which New York is famous. The single
most important decision on the question of zoning is
embodied in the case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company . (20) This was the Supreme Court's first decision
on the constitutionality of zoning legislation and
restrictions.
D. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
The Supreme Court first considered the constitu-
tionality of zoning restrictions in this case. At issue
was whether or not the village of Euclid's zoning ordinance
could prohibit the Ambler Realty Company from using property
for commercial purposes which the village had zoned for
residential use. (21) Ambler Realty believed that such a
restirction was an overextension of the state's police
powers. The Court upheld the ordinance. It found that
the restrictions related to the general welfare of its
citizens and therefore upheld the ordinance as a valid use
of police powers. (22) The Court stated that by excluding
commercial buildings from a residential area, the
legislature promoted the health of children, incrased fire
safety, and facilitated the enforcement of traffic and
general welfare regulations. The Court noted that although
the general public interest may at times outweigh a
municipality's interest in promoting police power objectives
through zoning regulation, this concern was compelling in
13

Euclid. (23)
E. Preservation and the Law:
Historic preservation may seem to have been accepted by
the public, but it has been challenged in the courts. Seen
as an overextension of government's powers by many
developers, cases have been brought before the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Court has heard cases which deal
with the preservation of site and of buildings. These
sites and buildings span in importance from the national to
the local. Three cases seem to have best defined historic
landmarking. These cases are United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Railway Company , 160 U.S. 668 (1896), (24); Berman
V. Parker
.
348 U.S. 26 (1954), (25); and Penn Central
Transportation Company v. New York City ( 26 )
.
1 . United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Railway Co.
The first case, United States v. Gettysburg , esta-
blished the precedent that condemnation by the government
could be used for preservation purposes, specifically at
important historic sites. (40) The Court wrote:
The battle of Gettysburg was one of the greatest
battles of the world... such a use seems necessarily not
14

only a public use, but one so closely connected with the
welfare of the republic itself as to be within the the
powers granted Congress by the Constitution for the
purpose of protecting and preserving the whole
country. " (28)
This case extended the powers of the United States
governinent to condemn for preservation purposes. Historic
sites before this time were saved only by the intervention
of private groups such as the Mount Vernon Ladies
'
Association. Following this case, the government began a
program of acquiring sites, mostly natural sites, to begin
the National Parks Service.
2 . Berman v. Parker
The second case is Berman v. Parker . The Supreme
Court's decision, although the case actually involved
condemnation under urban renewal statutes, strongly
supported land use controls based upon aesthetic
considerations. (29) The decision was unanimous. The
opinion stated:
It is within the power of the legislative to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well
as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced as
well as carefully patrolled." (30)
15

Berman v. Parker influenced many local governments to enact
preservation ordinances in the 1960s. (31) Before this
time, zoning and land use controls were geared towards the
preservation of open space, light, and air. The idea of a
pleasant built environment had never been considered, due to
the subjective nature of the terms aesthetic and beautiful.
This case supports design control regulations.
3
.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City
The third case, Penn Central Transportation Company v.
New York City, amplified the Court's ruling in Berman v.
Parker . The Court wrote:
[T]his Court has recognized, in a number of
settings, that the States and cities may enact land use
restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life
by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic
features of a city." (32)
The Court cited Berman as precedent. This case also
involves such legal dilemmas found in preservation such as
the issues of the unlawful taking of property and just
compensation. The Court settled the taking issue with the
following:
"It is, of course, true that the landmarks law has
more severe impact on some landowners than on others.
16

but that in itself does not mean that the law effects a
"taking'. Legislation designed to promote the general
welfare commonly burdens some more than others." (33)
In terms of compensation, the Court found that the
Terminal's unused development right may not have provided a
suitable return had a taking occurred. However, the rights
afforded were valuable. The rights lessened whatever
financial burdens the designation had imposed on the
Terminal and were taken into account in considering the
impact of the regulation. (34)
17

Ill . The Taking Issue
A. The Constitution and Taking
The issue of "taking" property is grounded in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
but how has it been interpreted by the Supreme Court? The
idea of landmarking and preservation and taking of property
has debated in the Courts. For every taking there must be
compensation. The sale and transfer of the development
rights is one solution. An examination of the legal
concept of taking, as defined by the Court, must start with
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon . (35) Two recent
decisions by the Court are then examined: Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictus { 36 ) and Nollan
V. California Coastal Commission. (37) These two cases
further the definition of what exactly is a taking. The
taking of property calls for the payment of compensation to
the owner. Two Supreme Court cases illustrate the Court's
stance on compensation. The Penn Central decision allows
for the transfer of development rights to serve as a means
of offsetting the financial burden caused by designation.
In the Fred F. French Investment Co. v. City of New York
(38) case, the New York State Court of Appeals found that
when a taking has occurred, the transfer of development
rights does not offset the impact of the legislation and the
legitimacy of the objective. The Court's recent First
English Evangelical Luthern Church of Glendale v. County of
18

Los Angeles (39) determines what is adequate compensation
when a legislative taking had occurred.
A taking of property occurs when the court finds that
regulation is overly burdensome in its restriction of use
without proper compensation in violation of the fifth and
Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. (40) The
starting point of any analysis of the Taking issue is the
decision by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Company
v . Mahon decided in 1922. When a landowner contends that
the Fifth Amendment has been violated due to legislative
action, landmarking for example, one or more of the
following restrictions can apply. First an owner's future
development options can be limited; second, development can
be made less financially attractive, lowering the value of
the site.; third, designation can restrict the owner's
vested rights; and fourthly, the owner can have a duty
placed upon him that requires him to maintain a structure in
a particular fashion and ultimately cost. (41)
19

B. The Classical Definition of a Taking
The Pennsylvania Coal Company was a mining company
which operated in the state of Pennsylvania. The coal
company had purchased large tracts of land to insure future
availability of areas in which to mine. To reduce the cost
acquisition, the Coal Company sold the surface rights to
Mahon's predecessor in title in 1878. The Company reserved
the right to remove all the coal underneath the site. The
contract that existed between the Company and the owners
stipulated that at some time in the future subsidence of the
surface would occur due to the mining operations. The
Mahons wished to "prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from
mining under their property in such a way as to remove the
supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of their
home." (42) The Mahons claimed that the Kohler Act passed
by the State of Pennsylvania on May 27, 1921 had taken away
the Coal Company's rights to mine below their home and the
Company's freedom from damage claims. (43)
The Kohler Act was an attempt by the State to protect
the homes of its residents in areas of mining activity.
The act forbade the mining of coal in an area that was used
as a residence or mining within 150 feet of an improved
property. (44) The statute superseded existing rights.
The Pennsylvania Coal Company claimed that the State had,
through the Kohler act, illegally taken their property.
The question for Chief Justice Holmes was whether or
20

not the Kohler Act was an overextension of the State's
police powers. (45) First, he needed to determine what
was the property interest of the Coal Company. Second, how
wide was the threat claimed by the Mahons. Justice Holmes
identified the property interest involved as the right to
mine coal. The Kohler Act destroyed that property interest
by making it impracticable to mine. He wrote, " What makes
the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised
with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.
This we think we are warranted in assuming that the statute
does. " (46)
Justice Holmes determined that the threat to the
general public was non-existent in this case and the Kohler
Act was an over compensation for an action that affected one
family. The property interest of the Company was
destroyed; it was not a partial diminution in value.
Holmes further stated that he found the State as well as the
Mahons short-sited to buy only a partial interest in their
property. He wrote, "the question at bottom is upon whom
the loss of the changes desired should fall. So far as
private persons or communities have seen fit to take the
risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that
the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the
giving to them greater rights than they bought." (47)
Holmes concluded, "We are in danger of forgetting that a
21

strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut then
the constitutional way of paying for the change." (48)
C. The Taking Issue in the 1970s: A New Criterion
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon set the standard for the
next fifty years of Supreme Court decisions. The limits of
government action were firmly stated. In the realm of
preservation, this limit was realized. When legal process
began for Penn Central, surely the New York preservationists
knew that the legal future of historic preservation hung in
the balance. In 1978, when the Supreme Court delivered its
opinion, it heralded in a new definition of taking that has
made historic preservation, and ultimately the transfer of
development rights, a viable feature in american life.
Judge Brennan identified four distinct steps necessary
to determine if a taking had occurred. First, is the
interest at issue sufficiently bound up with a reasonable
expectation of the claimant to constitute property for Fifth
Amendment purposes. Next, the property interest involved
must be identified. Third, analyze the character of the
legislative action. Finally, the nature and the extent of
the interference must be examined. Judge Brennan reached
the following conclusions. The air rights of the Terminal
were property for Fifth Amendment purposes. Penn Central
had a full fee interest in the site, not just in one
22

segment. The landmark law was part of a comprehensive
plan. The legislative action did not interfere with Grand
Central's action as a train station. It is these several
aspects of the case that ultimately differentiate the Penn
Central case from Pennsylvania Coal.
Brennan first addresses a central issue of taking
jurisprudence that was a key argument in Pennysylvania Coal:
the characterization of the property interest that is
alledged to have been taken. Holmes recognizes coal as a
"valuable estate" (49) and separate from the the surface
estate. He also stated that it was the owner's of the
surface estate obligation to secure all estates, thus
furthering the argument that land is divisible into estates
or layers. (50) Brennan's refutation is as follows:
""Taking ' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular government
action has affected a taking, this court focuses rather both
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent
of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. . .
"
(51)
In the Penn Central case, the air rights were seen as
part of the Terminal's property interest. Because the were
segments of the property were one and not seperate, action
to one particular segment of the site, such as the air above
the Terminal, can not be analysed in isolation.. In
23

Pennsylvania Coal, the right to mine coal was the property
interest. The Kohler Act, by not allowing for mining to
occur at a particular site, destroyed that property
interest He wrote concerning the government's action: "the
submission that appellants may establish a "taking' simply
by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit
a property interest that they hereforto had believed was
available for development is quite simple untenable." (52)
The third step of Brennan ' s analysis was determining
the character of the government's action. The Penn Central
Company claimed that the landmarking of its Terminal was an
undue burden, singling out the company from the rest of the
property owners. Brennan found "no merit" (53) in this
claim. He stated that the New York preservation program
"embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of
historic or aesthetic interest." (54) It is the presence
of this plan which distinguishes such legislation from
discrimatory spot zoning. (55)
Brennan continued to analyse the nature of the
designation. He introduced the concept of impact: "It is,
of course, true that the Landmarks Law has a more severe
impact on some landowners than others, but that in itself
does not mean that the law effects a taking. Legislation
designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens
some more than others." (56) Penn Central was not uniquely
burdened; other properties had been designated in New
York. Brennan concluded: "Unless we are to reject the
24

judgement of the New York City Council that the preservation
of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all
structures, both economically and by improving the quality
of life in the city as a whole-which we are unwilling to
do-we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have
in no sense been benefitted by the Landmarks Law." (57)
Finally, Brennan stated that the Landmarks Law in no
way "impaired the present use of the Terminal." (58) The
property interest was not taken for a city purpose such as
in Fred F. French. The effect of the Landmarks Law is to
simply "prohibit appellants or anyone else from occupying
portions of the airspace above the Terminal, while
permitting appellants to use the remainder of the parcel in
a gainful fashion." (59)
25

D. The Taking Issue in the 1980s
"...65 years later , we address a different set of
particular facts involving the Pennsylvania Legislature's
1966 conclusion that the Commonwealth's existing mine
subsidence legislation had failed to protect the public
interest in safety, land conservation, preservation of
affected municipalities' tax bases and land development in
the commonwealth." (60) So started Justice Stevens in his
opinion of the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
V. DeBenedictis . We are again in Pennsylvania and the
issue in question is land subsidence resulting from mining
coal. The Court affirmed two lower court decisions which
stated that the layers of land at issue in this case,
surface, support, and mineral, cannot be examined as
separate independent layers, but must be viewed as a segment
of a larger intertwined "bundle of rights that invariably
includes either the surface estate or the mineral estate.
"
(61) Penn Central is cited as precedent. While the Court
recognized similarities, they also noted that "the
similarities are far less significant than the differences
and that Pennsylvania Coal does not control this case.
"
(62)
Initially, it appears that Keystone continues the legal
standards established by the Penn Central decision. And
indeed it does. The changes that are to be of key
significance are found in the dissent written by Chief
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Justice Rehnquist. It is true that the dissenting opinion
does not alter judicial policy. Instead, one must view it
as a guide to determine the prevailing flow of judicial
thought.
Nollan V. California Coastal Commission displays the
more conservative agenda of the Rehnquist Court. The clock
appears to have been turned back on the constitutional issue
of property and taking. The case as it appeared before the
U.S. Supreme Court involved an easement across the
beachfront property of James and Marilyn Nollan. The
property had a small bungalow on it that the Nollans rented
out to summer vacationers. The bungalow eventually fell
into disrepair. The Nollans wished to demolish the
bungalow and replace it with a cottage three times as
large. By demolishing the bungalow, they took up their
long term option on the property and finely obtained
ownership in fee. They requested a coastal development
permit from the California Coastal Commission. The
Commission is charged with the protection of the California
coastline and reviews all applications for development along
the coast. They wished to replace the bungalow with a
three bedroom house in keeping with the character of the
neighbourhood's existing development. The Commission's
staff recommended "that the permit [to build] be granted
subject to the condition that they allow the public an
easement to pass across a portion of their property." (63)
This would allow for easier access by the public to two
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public beaches. The Nollans protested such an imposition.
The issue in this case is the question: should the state
have to pay the Nollans for the public use of their land as
a link between two beaches. The Commission stated that the
increased bulk of the Nollan's new home "would increase the
blockage of the view of the ocean. .. contributing to the
development of a ""wall of residential structures' that
would prevent the public from [realizing that there is a
stretch of coastline] that they have every right to visit."
(64) Private use of the shore would increase (65) as well
as "cumulatively burden the public's ability to traverse to
and along the shorefront. " (66)
The fact that some aspect of private property was taken
for public use, in the eyes of the Court, constituted a
taking. The California Coastal Commission would have been
within its limits to attach conditions to its permit if it
furthered the goals of the body. The condition for the
prohibition must advance some need outlined by the governing
body. But the Court stated, "[t]he evident constitutional
propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted
for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition." (67)
The Court was able to check legislative land use control.
The Court's evaluation of the situation concludes as
follows: "The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the
obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental
purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may
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be the outer limits of "legitimate state interests' in the
takings and land use context, this is not one of them. In
short, unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use, but an
out and out plan of extortion. " (68)
29

E. Compensation: The Payment for Police Powers
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects the property rights of its citizens. If property
is taken, the Constitution states that compensation must be
paid to the owner of the property. This protection of
one's rights stems back to the Middle Ages. The
government's ability to take property and compensate the
owner through eminent domain.
Compensation consists of paying the owner the fair
market value for his land. This is determined through
appraisal techniques: recent sales of similar sites, damages
to the owner, etc. The recent Supreme Court decision in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles , held that when a court has determined
that a particular regulation was so restrictive that it
constituted a "taking', the government must pay the property
owner just compensation even if property interest was only
"taken' temporarily. Stating the opinion of the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: "in this case the California
Court of Appeals held that a landowner who claims that his
property has been "taken' by a land use regulation
constitutes a "taking' of his property. We disagree, and
conclude that in these circumstances the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
would require compensation for that period." (69) The
Chief Justice went to great lengths to state that there is
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little difference between a permanent taking and one that is
temporary. Citing previous government practice, such as
paying for the use of land during the Second World War, he
wrote: "These cases reflect the fact that "temporary'
takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
property, are no different in kind from permanent takings,
for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation. "
(70)
Government is required to pay for use of the land
during this period just as an individual would pay rent on
an apartment. To void the legislation would not be "a
sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just
Compensation Clause. " (71) This would make the taking
temporary and, as mentioned above, still one which requires
some sort of renumeration. Quoting Chief Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal , Rehnquist concluded, "a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." (72)
Full compensation will now play an important role.
Simple payment for property is not enough, interest is
required. In cities such as New Orleans or Charleston
which have the oldest preservation ordinances in the nation,
a suit for damages, accumulated over time, could destroy the
city financially.
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F. Compensation and the Transfer of Development
Rights: The Penn Central Decision
Since the 1960s, there had always been a question as to
whether or not designation under a landmarks law, local or
otherwise was an over extension of a governing body's police
powers. If so, compensation was necessary. This question
had been answered in numerous Supreme Court decisions that
have already been mentioned. The question before the
Supreme Court in the Penn Central Transportation Company v
.
New York City (73) was twofold. The Court pondered the
question whether a city may use historic designation as a
means of preservation "without effecting a "taking'." (74)
The second question was one of compensation: was it
necessary and did it "mitigate whatever financial burdens
appellants have incurred." (75)
The Court decided that designation was not a taking in
this case. But the Court saw fit to extend its powers of
judicial review and state that the Terminal's air rights
were valuable. (76) Since the air rights were valuable,
the Court concluded that "while these rights may well not
have constituted "just compensation', if a "taking' had
occurred, the rights nevertheless mitigated whatever
financial burdens the law has imposed on the appellants..."
(77) The Court stated that regardless of their value at
this time, they are indeed a valuable commodity. In 1978,
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due to the rather soft office market in New York City,
undoubtably the value of the Terminal's air rights was not
readily discernible. In the boom market of 1984, most
certainly the the rights could easily be sold. The
Terminal became its own development rights bank, holding
onto its rights and selling as the market demand was
realized. The Court took a long-term view of the
development rights, realizing that their value at some point
would more than compensate the owners.
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G. Fred F. French Investment Co. v. City of New York
The case of Fred F. French Investment Company v. City
of New York was heard in the Court of Appeals of the State
of New York (the State's highest court). The City had
through legislative process determined that two private
parks in New York City's Tudor City apartment complex should
be zoned for park use only. The City reacted to the
Company's plan to build a skyscraper on the site and the
appeals for assistance from the complex's residents. The
Fred F. French Company held only a security interest in the
properties; it was not the owner. The Fred F. French
Investment Company sued the City for an illegal taking of
the property by the City's legislative action. The City
stated that if a taking had occurred, the investment company
would be compensated by the parks' development rights which
the City allowed to be transferred to an undesignated site
between Sixtieth and Thirty-eighth Streets and Third and
Eighth Avenues. The investment company reiterated that the
development rights were at best a high risk venture and at
worst, worthless. The Court stated at the onset of its
decision that the "value of property is not concrete or
tangible attribute but abstraction derived from economic
uses to which property maybe put; thus development rights
are essential component of value of underlying property,
because they constitute some of the economic uses to which
property may be put; such development uses may not be
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disregarded in determining whether a zoning ordinance has
destroyed economic value of underlying property." (78) In
principle, the Court of Appeals recognized the potential
value of a site's development rights. (79) But while
acknowledging the value of the air rights, the Court
conceded that development rights were of an "uncertain" (80)
market value. The parks' air rights transformed into
"floating development rights, utterly unsalable until they
could be attached to some accommodating real property,
available by happenstance of prior ownership or by grant,
purchase, or devise, and subject to the contingent approvals
of administrative agencies. In such case, development
rights. .. float in a limbo until restored to reality by
reattachment to tangible real property. .. [I]t is a tolerable
abstraction to consider development rights apart from the
solid land from which as a matter of zoning law they
derive. But severed, the development rights are a double
abstraction until they are actually attached to a receiving
parcel, yet to be identified, acquired, and subject to the
contingent future approvals of administrative agencies,
events which may never happen because of the exigencies of
the market and the contingencies and exigencies of
administrative action." (81) The Court noted that the
problem with this above arrangement is that "it fails to
assure preservation of the very real economic value of the
development rights as they existed when still attached to
the underlying property." (82) The intangible nature of
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the development rights lead to the Court's decision. A
body such as a development rights bank would have instantly
insured compensation for the property of the rights under
the State's power of eminent domain. (83)
The transfer of development rights will be compensation
in the future as long as real estate is considered as such.
As determined in Fred French , the development . rights of site
do have a value attached to the site. When they are
removed from the site, they lose their value. The Court
held that the extent to which an ordinance renders a
property unprofitable will determine whether a "taking' has
occurred. The Court will also look at how the ordinance
protects the public, what the goals of the ordinance were,
and how they were achieved. By zoning the parks so no
development could take place, the City completely destroyed
the economic value of the site. Once it has been
determined that a "taking' has occurred, it must be decided
if compensation has been paid. The use of transfer of
development rights are uncertain; compensation must be fair
market value-a fixed price. To allow something as
uncertain as the transfer of development rights to serve as
compensation is to allow for no compensation or below fair
market value compensation to be paid.
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IV. Transfer of Development Rights
A. Transfer of Development Rights: Preservation
Planning
Transfer of development rights is a concept developed
to account for the disparity between the zoned density for a
particular site and the actual density occupied by the
historic structure. It is the transfer of the unused yet
allowable development density from one site to another,
(84) The unused yet allowable rights above the landmark
are sold to the owner of an adjacent site or when
applicable, to the owner of a non-adjacent receiving site.
These rights are sold on the open market as land would be
sold. The purchaser of the rights is permitted to increase
either height, density, or occupancy levels. (85) In some
cities, such as New York, part of the profits of the sale
are put aside to pay for the support and maintenance of the
historic building.
B. The Zoned Lot Merger
The development rights that a building has are granted
by a districting scheme that affects all real property in
the City. (86) The development rights are not transferable
except in certain instances. Primarily, there are two ways
of transferring development rights. The first is the zoned
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lot merger. It is the simplest example of the transfer of
development rights system. (87) It consists of a group of
underdeveloped lots that are joined together or combined in
order to obtain a greater amount of allowable development.
(88) If some of the lots are built upon, as is the case
with historic buildings, and the floor area ratio is below
the prescribed amount, the city permits the additional
construction on any part of the composite site. The
proposed building with the existing structure is not to
exceed the granted floor to area ratio. (89) Laws
regarding lot mergers were developed in 1961 and 1977.
(90) Such notable examples of this kind of transfer are
the Helmsley Palace Hotel which used the rights of the
Villard Houses, Citibank's Wall Street office which used the
rights of the New York City National Bank at 55 Wall Street,
the tower behind the Racquet and Tennis Club at 370 Park
Avenue, and Academy House behind the Academy of Music in
Philadelphia. Proposed zone lot mergers in the recent past
have been announced for the Metropolitan Club on Fifth
Avenue at Fifty nineth Street and the old New York Cancer
Hospital at 103rd Street and Central Park West.
C. The movement of granted air rights
Transfer of development rights across lots, a
relatively new concept dating from the late 1960s, has
appeared quite strongly in the New York preservation
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scene. In a city like New York where every available bit
of land in the mid-town business district is precious, there
is a great deal of pressure on the area's landmarks. The
lots must be in common ownership in fee or bound together
through a long term lease.
The City established a new type of development control
in the late 1970s. The unused development potential of a
historically designated lot could be transferred to a non
contiguous lot. This was done to allow for a high level of
light and air over the landmark. (91) In 1968, amendments
to the New York Zoning Resolution permitted the Planning
Commission to authorize transferrance to specific adjacent
lots. The resolution stated that the air rights maybe
transferred to a contiguous lot, to one across the street
from the landmark, or diagonally across an intersection.
The maximum FAR overage on the transfer site was not to
exceed 20 percent. The amount of transferable floor area
is derived by subtracting the existing floor area of the
landmark building from the allowable area. The transferred
floor area is irrevocably subtracted from the site and a
plan for the preservation and maintenance of the landmark
must be submitted to the City Planning Commission. (92)
This was amended in 1969 to allow for the a chain of
ownership. A chain was determined to be a group of
properties owned out-right by a single individual. The
properties could qualify as a chain of ownership if the
owner of one property securred a legal agreement with the
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owners between his site and and the landmark site. The
agreement must be long term. When a specific area needs
protection, it is within the powers of the City to create
special preservation and receiving zones for the rights. (93)
The transfer of development rights system is viewed by
many as a friend to the beleaguered urban landmark.
Transfers do not add to the bulk of the city such would be
the case zoning bonuses. John J. Costonis wrote in his
work. Space Adrift , that the transfer of development rights
maintains the status quo by the creation of a transfer of
development rights receiving zone superimposed upon the
existing business district. (94) Costonis wrote, "Cities
adopting the version of the Chicago Plan under which
transfer districts encompass areas of landmark concentration
merely redistribute the density that has already been
authorized for these areas by the zoning code; they do not
create additional density as in the the case of zoning
bonuses. " (95
)
There have been some rather noticeable instances of
transferred development rights. Amster Yard involves the a
transfer of unused development rights that were granted for
a historic block of rowhouses with a central court. The
transfer was delayed for six years when the New York office
market became soft. Grand Central Terminal and the South
Street Seaport District are two other examples of
transferred development potential. A more recent one is
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the recommendation for the creation of a special Broadway-
Theater District similar to the Seaport District in its
employment of transfer of development rights. (96)
The transfer of the development rights of historic
structures has been used to protect some rather important
structures and areas of New York City. But is it a
friendly means of preservation or does it create chaos?
Most certainly, the movement of development rights could
cause an urban planning nightmare. As Norman Marcus wrote
in his summation of transferring air rights and the City
plan, " A well understood plan at the outset avoids the
unpredictable dealing of discretionary TDR wild cards down
the road." (97) Compared with the zoned lot merger, the
transfer of landmark development rights allows for a sounder
movement of the City's bulk because of its many safety
features. In order for both the City's historic past and
its livable present to be preserved, the landmark transfer
must be made more attractive than the zoned lot merger.
The landmark transfer is futile in the absence of a sound
plan and fixed municipal control.
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V. The Chicago Plan
A. An Introduction
The Chicago Plan is the brainchild of John J. Costonis
in his book, Space Adrift; Landmark Preservation and the
Marketplace . Space Adrift and its Chicago Plan was
Costonis 's attempt to reverse the trend of destruction that
afflicts our nation's "urban centrally located building in
private ownership..." (98) A central feature of the Plan
is its utilization of transfer of development rights as a
means of preserving landmarks of the Chicago School of
Architecture. The development rights are moved or
transferred to another site, allowing the owner of the
receiving site to build a taller than zoned structure. The
payment to the owner of the landmark for his development
rights is supposed to relieve some of the economic pressures
on him to demolish his low-level landmark and replace it
with a taller, more profitable structure. (99)
The Chicago Plan attempts to avoid some of the
constitutional issues already mentioned. Notably, the
Chicago Plan squarely addresses the question of adequate
compensation for the landmark owner. In the Fred F . French
case, one saw that the development rights were only as
valuable as the market and only if immediately attached to
another receiving site. Costonis has anticipated this
dilemma by his insistence on a municipal development rights
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bank to absorb the rights as they appear on the market.
This will be explained in further detail.
From a density perspective, Costonis defends his plan
against critics who would state that the transfer of
development rights increases density. Costonis states
that, compared to zoning bonuses which add density to the
urban scene, transfer of development rights does not add to
the city's density. Bonus space, wrote Costonis, is added
"ex nihilo by the city... bonus programs inject new
increments of density into the community." (100) Transfer
of development rights on the other hand, "do not create new
space, they merely redistribute space that has already been
authorized." (101)
B. The Chicago Plan and Planning
One problem with the Chicago Plan is its reliance on
the municipality's planning office. The city must be
willing to do a great deal of homework in order for the Plan
to be fully effective. (102) What influenced the Supreme
Court's decision in the Penn Central case was its belief
that the New York Landmarks Preservation Commission based
its decisions on a well thought out plan. (103) This
protected the Commission from charges of reverse spot
zoning. Costonis points out two specific reasons why
planning is of such importance for the Chicago Plan: first,
transfer of development rights, as well as incentive
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programs are part of an overall scheme. The incentive
program must augment, not hinder, the goals of the munici-
pality as set forth in its municipal plan. (104) Secondly,
an incentive program that allows for either zoning bonuses
or development rights transfers must be "sensitively
correlated with the prescribed amenity's capacity to offset
the building's greater bulk. [With] development rights
transfers, the redistribution of the low density use's
excess rights must not occur at the cost of disrupting
either the area's public services or its dimensional scale."
(105)
C. The Foundation of the Chicago Plan
The Chicago Plan, with its techniques of transferred
rights, uses four points inherent in today's landmark
problems as a foundation. First, many landmarks are of a
lower density than allowed by current zoning. (106)
Second, most landmarks are capable of returning a profit to
their owners. Their problem is one of the "dispropor-
tionate value of their sites in relation to the landmark
buildings." (107) Third, these landmarks are usually to be
found in the compact, high density business sectors of our
cities. (108) And finally, public facilities and services
are most often plentiful in these areas, allowing for more
people to be absorbed with a greater efficiency. (109)
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These four characteristics form the foundation of a
preservation plan with which the city can employ development
rights transfers. They are the point of departure. (110)
A city council can slowly build its transfer plan into its
existing code, adding the necessary ground work for a full
implementation of the plan. The goals of a transfer
program should be to preserve the historic landmark, cause a
minimum of disruption on the cityscape, keep the structure
on the city's tax rolls, minimize acquisition in fee of
buildings and retain the buildings original use when it is
economically feasible for such a continued use. These four
elements of the Chicago Plan are the incentive package, the
development rights transfer district, the preservation
restriction, and the development rights bank.
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D. The Incentive Package
The incentive program begins with a landmark commission
appraisal of the economic consequences of its designation of
a property. Once this is determined, the commission will
formulate a financial package that includes a real estate
tax reduction, in accordance with most existing state laws,
and an authorization to transfer the landmark's unused
development rights. (Ill) Subsidies to cover losses may
come in the form of additional development rights from the
municipal development rights bank. The city would either
calculate the value of a site's air rights on a case-by-case
basis or periodically update an index of the value of the
development rights at stated increments for all parcels in
the rights transfer district. (112) Costonis states that
the tax reduction would make the incentive package most
attractive because "tax savings will have a dramatic impact
upon the profitability of landmark buildings." (113)
E. The Preservation Restriction
The preservation restriction is to insure that the
owners of the landmark will continue to preserve the source
of those rights. The preservation restriction allows the
owner to qualify for various tax benefits. (114) The city
can not acquire all of its historic buildings, but it is, of
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course, committed to their preservation. To establish a
type of covenant that runs with the land will insure its
continued integrity . The preservation restriction should
include the legal authority upon which the restriction is
based; restriction on use; covenants forbidding demolition
or alteration; restoration requirements and maintenance
obligations; remedies for failure to return a reasonable
profit; and duration of the restriction. (115) Each of
these conditions will vary according to each municipalities
laws and degree of preservation standards.
F. The Development Rights Transfer District
The third component of the Chicago Plan is the
development rights transfer district. The rights, as
mentioned earlier must be part of a well considered plan.
The transfer of development rights district must fit into
this plan. There are two techniques for determining where
the receiving district is to be located. The district can
either be founded in conjunction with the area with the
highest concentration of landmarks or independent of this
core area.
The first type of district is best illustrated by the
recently proposed Special Theater District in New York.
(116) The receiving district for the rights in the Theater
District overlap the Core Theater District. The receiving
zone umbrellas the preservation zone. Instead of having
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the transferred rights move solely to an adjacent site, they
can be moved freely throughout the district. But it must
be remembered, the public facilities and services must be
able to support the increased bulk and usage. (117)
Allowing for a freer movement of air rights prevents
buildings of undimensional scale being placed at the end of,
for example, a block of row houses.
The second type of district is where the air rights
are transferred away from the core area. This is best
illustrated by the Georgetown Waterfront Historic District
in Washington D.C. (118) Simply, the development rights
from the waterfront were transferred to a specific zone that
encompassed lots which bordered the route of Washington's
new Metro system. It was anticipated that the advent of
the subway would warrant greater density allotments. (119)
The density along the proposed route was not increased.
Already determined rights from the waterfront district were
made available to be transferred from the point of origin to
the new subway corridor. This use of transfer of
development rights made up for the discrepancy between
available rights found along the subway route and needed
rights along the route.
G. The Municipal Development Rights Bank
The final feature of the Chicago Plan is the municipal
development rights bank. The municipal development rights
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bank has already been mentioned in relation to the Fred F.
French Investment Company case. With a bank ready and able
to buy the rights, they no longer would have been
speculative. The landmark owner would always have a place
to sell his development rights. The bank would derive its
supply of development rights from three sources. The first
source is from landmarks in immediate danger of demolition.
The city would first give the owner of the property an
option to sell the rights to either the bank or on the open
market. If the owner refused, the city could use its power
of eminent domain to acquire the building's development
rights in fee and pay the owner compensation for his loss.
(120)
The second group of landmarks is also in private
ownership. These development rights would be transferred to
the bank by donations. There would be specific tax
advantages to donating the rights compared with selling them
to the bank. (121) These benefits would have to be written
into the municipal tax code if there was no provision for
this sort of donation.
Municipally owned landmarks are the third source of
development rights. Since many distinguished buildings are
publicly owned, this could be a considerable source of
income for the development rights bank. By transferring
these rights to the bank, the "city can enroll an otherwise
dormant municipal resource in the service of a worthy public
purpose. " (122
)
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These are the basic components of the Chicago Plan.
Most municipal programs that contain a development rights
transfer technique have followed, at least in part, the
Chicago Plan. New York City's transfer of development
rights program is one of the more fully developed rights
programs in the country. It, however, does have its
differences with the Chicago Plan.
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VII . The New York City Program
A. Introduction
The New York City statute was amended in 1968 to allow
for the transfer of development rights. It authorized the
Planning Commission to oversee the transfer of rights from a
landmark to a specific adjacent lot. The adjacent lot was
defined as either contiguous, across a street or across an
intersection. (123) In 1969, the term adjacent site was
redefined to include linked tracts of land that could
conceivably span more than one street. The new definition
permitted "an air rights transfer to any lot in a chain of
common ownership, as long as the first link in the chain is
across the street from or contiguous to a landmark site.
"
(124) Increases in bulk were not to exceed 20 percent of
the unused rights. The transfer could be made to one or
several adjacent sites.
The new building was required to meet specific
standards of design. The new building had to be compatible
in scale to the landmark. The owner of the landmark must
use part of his profits from the sale of the air rights to
create a trust fund for the maintenance of the landmark.
The specific maintenance program was to be worked out by the
Landmarks Preservation Commission on a case-by-case basis.
(125)
In the 1970s, the transfer of development rights
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program's guidelines were relaxed to allow for three
things. The first was the right to utilize a structure's
full development potential. Full transfer of unused
development rights could now be transferred to a single site
in a high density, commercial district. The second was the
initiation of the area wide plan for transferring and
receiving development rights. (126) This is similar to
Costonis's development rights transfer zone. The third was
the separate creation of a receiving zone such as one would
find employed at the South Street Seaport District. Here,
the development rights zone and the commercial zone do not
overlap due to the special, historic nature of the
Seaport. To retain its character fully, it was insured
that the development zone with its increased bulk would be
away from the historic area so as not to destroy its
character and scale. The South Street Seaport is only one
of New York ' s areas that has used the transfer of
development rights to insure its financial security and
retain its historic character.
The fundamental difference between the transfer of
development rights program as it evolved in the 1970s and
the zoned lot merger technique, its chief rival, is the
presence of a specific preservation component in the
transfer program. The zoned lot merger can occur for any
structure, at any contiguous lot. The zoned lot merger
does not entail the movement of rights across lots of
different ownership. It is simply the combination of a lot,
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in this instance a landmark lot, with an adjoining lot. The
zoning potential of the site is newly determined to
incorporate the increased size of the lot minus the existing
bulk of the building that is retained.
B. Amster Yard
Amster Yard , a small residential enclave on the eastern
side of Manhattan's mid-town was one of the first projects
to utilize the 1968 resolution. The site is an ensemble of
privately owned nineteenth century residences and commercial
structures with a communal garden in the interior of the
block. Amster Yard is east of Third Avenue between
Forty-ninth and Fiftieth Streets. The owner of the
landmarked property offered for sale his unused air rights
to an adjacent parcel on Third Avenue where an office tower
was planned. (127) The air rights sold for $494,731.
$100,000 of this amount was eventually set aside to be used
as a trust fund for the maintenance of the site. (128) The
five trustees of the fund were chosen from the significant
players in the transfer group. Sadly, this original plan
failed due to the failure of the New York office space
market in the mid 1970s.
The Amster Yard plan was revived in a somewhat
different form in the early 1980s. A restrictive
declaration was signed instead of forming a new trust
fund. The declaration was in favour of the
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New York Landmarks Conservancy. The owner received $35,000
for immediate repairs and maintenance and covenanted to
provide regular maintenance for the structure and be subject
to periodic inspections of the landmark. The Conservancy
was granted the power to compel that work be done. They
were allowed to enter into a contractual agreement with a
contractor if the organization felt that necessary work was
not being done to the Yard. (129) The owner of Amster Yard
did not receive any additional compensation for the sale of
the air rights.
As can be seen, the transfer of Amster Yard's deve-
lopment rights could be completed despite New York's soft
office market. Fred F . French is an example of another
attempted transfer in a soft, unsure market. These two
cases illustrate the two sets of events that can occur when
the market for new construction is weak and an attempt is
made to transfer development rights. The owner of the air
rights needs a buyer for his rights. Amster Yard had found
a buyer for its rights: the sale was made. The loser was
the developer, not the landmark owner. If the Fred F.
French organization had been able to find an immediate buyer
for its rights, the case would not have occurred.
C. South Street Seaport District
The South Street Seaport District is an enclave south
of the Brooklyn Bridge in Manhattan, consisting mostly of
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two hundred year old buildings. It is the last waterfront
area in Manhattan representative of New York's maritime
prowess during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The district surrounds the Fulton Fish Market. The area is
unquestionably historic, but it was also clearly an
uneconomic use of land in an area that was experiencing an
economic boom in land prices.
The South Street Seaport District is significant for
two reasons. The first is that the preservation area and
the redevelopment area are drawn so as to not overlap as one
discovers with the Mid-town Theater District recently
proposed. This prevents these diminutive historic buildings
from becoming overwhelmed by modern behemoths. The second
significance is the introduction of private-sector
commercial banks to act as the transfer of development
rights bank instead of the City fulfilling that role. At
the outset of the venture, it was decided that multiple
transfers would be allowed. This meant that the owner of
the historic properties were allowed to convey his
development rights to either the bank or directly into the
market-sector receiving lot. (130) The banks released
their mortgages on the properties, thus enabling the owners
to "convey their development rights and secure investment"
(131) for the maintenance or rehabilitation of their
landmarks. The middleman was the consortium of banks that
initially released their mortgages. These banks served as
the repository for the preservation area's development
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rights. As warranted, they would move rights to
predetermined receiving sites in the redevelopment
district. This predesignation of development parcels
circumvents the problem of floating rights. The presence
of a rights bank insures the immediate purchase of the
rights. The rights are now marketable and the variable of
speculation and undetermined risk are removed, thus
preventing a reoccurrence of a Fred French problem. As an
added benefit, the transfer rights were not used for
increases in height, but increased the permissible amount of
tower coverage of a specific lot. This allowed for the
retention of the area height as zoned, resulting in some
degree of height compatibility for the area. (132)
In one example, 300,000 square feet of air rights were
purchased from the development rights bank. Tower coverage
restrictions were waived. The sale generated $1,500,000, a
figure below the area's square footage rate for land. The
proceeds of the sale were used to balance the books on the
forgiven mortgage debt. Other buildings in the area
purchased 142,868 square feet and 275,000 square feet from
the development rights bank. In 1984, there was still over
a half of a million square feet left in the development
rights bank. (133)
D. Tudor City
The failure of New York's transfer of development
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rights program is best illustrated by its Tudor City
proposal. This proposal was the impetus for the Fred F.
French case. Tudor City is a group of apartment houses
that surround two small open parks. The site is located on
Forty-second Street between First and Second Avenues. The
Tudor City proposal was an attempt by the City to move
development rights from the small parks which the residents
of the complex lobbied to save from development to a
location in the central mid-town area. The City of New
York, in response to the lobbying efforts of the residents,
created a Special Parks District, zoning the park sites to a
level of zero density. As mentioned earlier in the
evaluation of the case, the Courts found that to create such
a zone for the parks was an overextension of the City's
police powers. The transferred rights were deemed to be of
an uncertain value and, therefore, not adequate compensation
for the density mandate by the City.
The City, in its desire to preserve much needed green
space and answer to its constituents wishes, created a
floating zone transfer of development rights system for the
owner of the Tudor City air rights. (134) Unlike Amster
Yard or South Street Seaport with their predetermined
sites, the Tudor City owners were told by the City that they
own these air rights. However, they must not only find a
purchaser for the rights, but the site for them as well.
This was certainly the cause for the failure of the City to
win its suit. Whether the rights originate from an
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adjacent site or from a predetermined preservation zone, the
rights must be able to withstand the market into which they
are thrust. To allow for the transfer of development
rights to an adjacent site partly shields the municipality
from judicial challenge due to the fact that the rights will
be transferred when the non-landmark site is ready for
development. When there is a specific zone or group of
sites designated to receive the rights, the question of
where the rights are to go is answered. However, as
mentioned in conjunction with the Fred F. French case, the
only sure way that transfer of development rights will work
in such a situation as with Tudor City is for there to be a
development rights bank.
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VII . Economics
A. The Economics of Transfer of Development Rights
The transfer of development rights is above all an
economic program. Its goal is to make urban landmarks
profitable. The example in Space Adrift uses four
landmarks in Chicago's Loop to formulate a methodology for
computing the cost per square foot for development rights.
(135) Those examples are as good as any to illustrate a
formulative process for determining costs. The costs of
the development rights will vary from site to site. As an
example, the development rights sold to the Philip Morris
Corporation for their world headquarters sold for twice the
market rate for land in the vicinity; at Amster Yard, the
rights sold for a bit below market rates.
New construction which involves transferred development
rights must still be guided by a developer's desire to
maintain a low level of costs and a high level of profit.
The new building must have a square footage of at least
28,000 per floor for a satisfactory return. As much square
footage as possible should be accommodated on the lower
floors, primarily the first, second and third floors. The
shape of the new building should approximate a square as
closely possible to allow for an efficient use of space and
to allow for the greatest amount of rental space.. (136) A
cost increase of 8 percent per floor over the cost per
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square foot for the construction of those floors is assumed
as the cost growth rate. (137) This is according to the
Marshall Valuation Service. The cost of construction
increases as a building becomes taller due to increase in
time, labour, and construction costs. We will assume a
construction cost figure of $50 per square foot for the
first through the third floors. This figure is not derived
from any actual figure used in New York's real estate
market. A recent New York Times article regarding the
proposed Theater District placed the value of land at $40
/square foot. With construction costs for the first three
floors, one can assume that the cost will be greater than
the the price of acquisition due to other factors which must
be taken into account.
Certain assumptions are made at the outset. Each
floor has an area of 30,000 square feet. The construction
cost for the first three floors is $50 per square foot.
This is the starting point.
1) total square footage-floors 1,2,3
30,000 X 3 = 90,000 sq ft
2) total construction cost for floors 1,2,3
$50 per sq ft x 90,000 sq ft = $4,500,000
The as-of-right height for the site is 20 stories.
The cost growth for the next 17 stories must be
determined. First must be determined the total square
footage for the rest of the building.
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3) total square footage-floors 4-20
30,000 X 17 = 510,000 sq ft
4) total construction cost for floors 4-20 with
cost growth of 8% per floor carried to the 17th
power
510,000 X $50 X (1.08)-^^ = $94,350,460
The cost per square foot for the twenty story building
is determined by dividing the total cost of construction by
the square footage of the building.
5) cost per square foot. The total construction
cost for the building is divided by the the
total square footage.
$98,850,460/(90,000 + 510,000) = $164.75psf
total cost equals the addition of the
figures in steps 2 and 4
The developer of the site agrees to purchase an
additional five floors worth of develpment rights to
increase the height of his building and obtain more valuable
rental space. The market rate for land in the
neighbourhood averages to $20 per square foot. The
negotiated price for the development rights is $18 per
square foot.
6) total square footage for the additional five
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floors .
30,000 X 5 = 150,000
The additional air rights will increase the amount of
square footage in the building by 150,000. The acquisition
cost for the rights is this amount times the cost per square
foot for those rights.
7) acquisition cost
$18 X 150,000 = $2,700,000
The total cost for the construction of this building
with an additional five stories is determined by using the
initial figure for the construction of the first three
stories, $50 per square foot. However, this time the the
height of the building is twenty five stories, not twenty.
The base figure of 4.5 million dollars is not changed. The
costs for floors 4-25 are determined.
8) total square footage of floors 4-25
22 X 30,000 = 660,000 sq ft
The next step is to determine a construction cost per
square foot which encorapases the additional five floors.
9) construction cost for floors 4-25. The
figure is carried out to the 22nd power.
660,000 X $50 X (1.08)^^ = $179,405,833
In step 9, it was determined what the cost of
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construction cost of the the first three stories of $4.7
million will be added to this figure to determine a final
construction cost.
10) Total cost of construction
$4,500,000 + $179,410,000 = $183,910,000
Added to this figure is the cost of acquiring the
additional air rights
11) $183,910,000 + $2,700,000 = $186,610,000
The cost per square foot for the twenty five story
building is dtermined by dividing the figure derived in step
11 by the total square footage of the building.
12) cost per square foot
$186,610,000/750,000 = $248.80psf
The cost of the building with the development rights is
of course higher than the cost for the twenty story
building; the cost of acquisition must be figured in the
final cost. By subtracting the cost per square foot for
the as-of-right building from the cost per square of the
building with the development rights, one can determine the
cost per square foot for the additional floor space. The
additional floor space cost an additional $84 per square
foot.
While it may seem that the cost of preservation and
transfer of development rights makes such a program
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unattractive, one must remember that certain factors are
present that will mitigate such losses. First of all,
there is the fact that office space on higher floors command
higher rates. Part of the acquisition cost can be
recovered there. Secondly, new construction in the central
area of mid-town will be able to sell at going market rate
or higher as the building is new and it is creating new and
needed space in the area. The rental rate for the building
depends on maintenance costs, rate of recapture of the
investment, market rate, and other factors. A complete
study of the relationship between development rights, rental
rates, and recapture is to be found in chapter four of Space
Adrift. (138)
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VIII. Transfer Systems
A. Types of systems
As we have seen, three types of transfer systems exist
for development rights and are utilized in New York.: the
adjacent lot; the receiving zone, both the overlapping and
the separate zones; and the unlimited free zone. The free
zone is discredited and ill-advised for use as part of a
transfer program due to its inability to withstand
constitutional challenge at this time under existing
conditions. Its future is uncertain and with preservation
and the transfer of development rights facing risks both in
the courts and the varied market place, its use is not
feasible. The remaining two systems are the most likely to
succeed. Both are currently in the New York press as the
City attempts to preserve two of its famous resources: Grand
Central Terminal and the Broadway Theater.
B. Grand Central and the question of adjacency
The transfer of development rights from Grand Central
has been a source of much publicity and confusion for more
than a decade. One of the first buyers of the Grand
Central air rights was Philip Morris Corporation, Inc.
Philip Morris entered into negotiations with the Terminal
when it was decided that it was to build its new world
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headquarters across the street from the Terminal at Forty
second Street and Park Avenue. Philip Morris needed
additional height and tower coverage to make its 200,000
square foot lot more economically feasible. (139) Philip
Morris acquired the equivalent of three more stories in
height from the Terminal at a price that was twice the
current rate for land in that area. (140) The New York
City transfer of development rights program allows for a
receiving site to increase its overage by 20 percent. The
City relaxed this provision that dates from 1958 to permit
the transfer of all of the development potential to a single
site in a high density commercial district without regard to
the 20 percent limit. This was done in 1975 in response to
requests by Penn Central. (141)
Recently, a proposed transfer of rights from Grand
Central has been in the newspapers. Grand Central has
agreed to sell its air rights to a site at 383 Madison
Avenue—a site which lies three blocks away from the
Terminal. What makes the transfer controversial is not
only the number of rights that were transferred to one site,
but the basis of the railroad's claim that the sites are
adjacent.
The proposition for 383 Madison involves the
construction of a building that is 74 stories tall north of
the Terminal. The tower's developer. First Boston
Corporation, proposed to use 800,000 square feet of the
Terminal's air rights. The site is within the high density
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mid-town commercial area. The allowable bulk of the site
is a mere 600,000 square feet. The additional air rights
would more than double the bulk allowed on the site. This
proposal involves a complicated set of legal, planning, and
landmark issues. (142)
As mentioned earlier, the transfer of development
rights program in New York allows for the transfer to
adjacent lots, across streets or diagonally across
intersections. Development rights can also be moved
through a chain of ownership to a distant yet adjacent by
virtue of the chain of ownership site. (143) Penn Central,
it is claimed by the First Boston Corporation's lawyer
Edward N. Costikyan, may have sold its surface rights, but
"it retained "subsurface' ownership rights to the land
underneath them, much of which includes the railroad
tracks". (144) The idea of separate estates of land is not
new. Again one can see that the question of surface and
sub-surface rights has yet to resolved. Similar to the
claim made in Pennsylvania Coal , Penn Central claims that it
has not sold its sub-surface rights and thus claim that it
is this underground chain of ownership that allows for the
transfer to the distant yet adjacent site. According to
their claim, it is only at the Grand Central site that their
ownership extends both up to the stars and down to the
center of the earth. Ownership of the sub-surface tracks
creates a horizontal chain of title. If one can imagine a
rectangular piece of wood with another piece of wood placed
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perpendicularly above it. The vertical piece of wood would
represent the landmark site that is Grand Central
Terminal. The horizontal piece of wood represents the
sub-surface rights of the Terminal that are the rights of
the railroad tracks. The surface rights above the tracks
were sold off when the tracks were covered . If the
argument is upheld in court, it is believed that the
railroad could "argue for a chain that follows its tracks
out of town". (145)
As a planning issue
,
it has rather severe repercus-
sions. This would be the largest sale air rights to take
place. Such a large sale for this particular site would
create an increase in density that is, in the words of the
New York Times, "a mistake, a massive mistake." (146) The
area is now one of New York's most congested. The City
made a sound planning decision when it determined that the
site was to be zoned for 600,000 square feet. To more than
double the size of the building on the site would be
planning madness. The Times mentioned salient points:
"Even with tunnels to Grand Central, its workers and
visitors would further pack already crowded sidewalks;
deliveries would further pack already crowded streets, and
the whole would pile new weight on the growing mid-town
crush." (147)
For landmarks, the outcome of 383 Madison could mean
disaster. One of the central results of the Supreme
Court's Penn Central decision was its recognition of the
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potential of selling the landmark's unused air rights as a
means of compensation. If a taking had occurred, the value
of the air rights might have been viewed as an adequate form
of compensation. The Supreme Court stated that the
Terminal's air rights helped to mitigate any financial
burden imposed on the owners due to designation. This is
based on the assumption that the rights can be sold. If
the City Council does not allow the rights to be sold, they
are in essence, rebutting the claim that the rights have a
value. If they are worthless, then perhaps a taking had
occurred. This could make the extent of the legislative
imposition so great that the court could claim that to
designate a landmark is an over-extension of police
powers. The New York Times wrote aptly when it cited the
potential threat to the Terminal: "If its owners are unable
to apply their air rights on one of the other sites, the
Terminal's landmark status would be imperiled." (148)
Rising behind Mercury, one could again see a Breueresque
project atop Grand Central Terminal.
An application for the transfer was made to the City
Planning Department in August 1986. This was followed by a
preliminary draft environmental impact statement in October
1986. A revised draft was submitted in November of 1987.
The Planning Department never certified the developer's
application as complete for public land-use review. Early
this year the developer went to court to force the issue.
(149)
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Last month, the State Supreme Court ordered the City to
act on certification within 30 days, after the developer
submits specific information on air quality and traffic
impact. The City is appealing the decision. (150)
C. The Broadway Theater District
The New York Theater has been for many years the crown
jewel of the theatrical world. To be "on Broadway" was
indeed an honour and to "play the Palace" meant that one was
at the apex of his career. But since the early to mid
seventies, the New York theater on Broadway has declined,
many theaters remain empty: still more have been demolished
or are used for non-legitimate theater. Following the
demolition of the Morosco Helen Hayes Theaters, a group of
concerned actors and citizens, along with the City's
blessings, founded the Theater Advisory Council.
The Theater Advisory Council created a report entitled
To Preserve the Broadway Theater . (151) The report focused
on a specific area of theaters that are located in what has
been designated by the Council as the Core Theater
District. Amongst its recommendations for the Core Theater
District are landmarking by the Landmarks Preservation
Commission, preservation covenants, and historic
districting. It outlines criteria for evaluation of
economic hardship and restrictions in scale and use. A
central feature of the report is its recommendation that the
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transfer of development rights tool as a means of
preservation. The Report follows standard City policy on
the transferrance of rights: across streets and
intersections, chain of ownership, etc. (152) The report
also allows for certain zoning bonuses and development
benefits. These include "waiver of height and setback
zoning rules." (153) The neighbourhood west of Broadway is
of a generally small scale. There is an attempt to retain
not only the scale of the surrounding neighbourhood by
placing it outside the receiving zone, but to protect it
further by the creation of a suggested Broadway Theater
Historic District. The receiving zone for the Core
District's air rights is concentrated between Sixth and
Eighth Avenues and along Forty second Street. (154)
However, the area is sure to be placed under shadow as the
larger buildings, the result of transferred rights and
bonuses, spring up along the fringe of the area. Also,
there is no component in the Report to prevent the usual
increase in rents that accompanies historic districting.
The neighbourhood not only is home to many New Yorkers, but
is also a place of business for many of the support services
for the theater trade. While the theaters are justly
slated for preservation and there is some realization that
the neighbourhood's scale is to be retained, there is no
attempt to retain the character of the area.
Transfer of development rights must be part of a
well-considered plan in order for it to be accepted by the
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public, developers, sellers of air rights and the courts.
Without such a plan, the repercussions to the surrounding
area could be disastrous. Admittedly, this is a projection
of the future, but as development spreads through the area,
the fringe area west of Eighth Avenue to the river will most
certainly be affected. Integrated with the Theater plan
must be a larger preservation plan for the area which would
attempt to protect the scale and the theatrical support
industries such as lighting shops, scenery studios, actors'
workshops, and theatrical bookshops which contribute
significantly to the theatrical character of Broadway.
The Theater Advisory Council's recommended transfer of
development rights program is as follows. The Council
extended to theater owners the right to move unused
development rights to a receiving zone which overlaps the
Core Theater District. The transfers would occur on the
condition that the theater owner/renter into a covenant with
the City. (155) The covenant would run with the deed of
the theater. The covenant, as stated in the Report, "would
bind the theater owner and his successors not to demolish
the theater and to use [the theater] as a legitimate
theater." (156) Appropriate short term provisions would be
allowed for non-theater uses during so-called dark
periods. The owner of the theater would be required to pay
over a portion of his receipts from the sale of the air
rights to the New York City Theater Trust. The Theater
Trust is a recommendation of the Report. Theater owner
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Robert Nederlander has stated that the cost to run a theater
is $250,000 a year. This sum, according to Nederlander is
"insufficient to induce owners to forgo the sole potential
of a non-economic property for a non-theater use." (157)
Nederlander
' s prediction is illustrated by the
following example, also found in The New York Times. Under
a scheme called the Theater Retention Bonus, the owner of a
development site within the theater district, but outside
the core, could increase the size of the new building by one
FAR through payment to the owner of a theater site. For
example, on a 30,000 square foot avenue site, the developer
is allowed to build a 450,000 square foot building. With
additional square footage from the transferred rights, the
total square footage for the site would be 480,000 square
feet. The price per square foot for the additional 30,000
square feet is assumed at $40 a square foot: the average
price of land in the area. The sale price would be $1.2
million. The Times assumes a return of 8 percent with the
money. The return would be $96,000 a year with a return
calculated to be somewhat lower, possibly $57,000, after
taxes. (158)
The sale of the rights through the Theater Retention
scheme would not prohibit the theater owner from selling his
rights to a neighbouring building plot. This, however, is
not a practical option for many mid-block theater owners.
The use of the bonus would obligate the theater owner to
sign the above mentioned covenant. Gerald Schoenfeld of
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the Shubert Organization stated that the covenant was too
"hefty" to assume for an increase of one FAR. (159)
The problem with the retention bonus is that the
available development rights in the core area is estimated
to be approximately three million square feet. The
purchase of one FAR is too small a figure to compensate the
owners of these unused rights. To use up that much under
the bonus plan would require 150 sites of 20,000 square
feet. It is not known if that many sites of that size
exist in the transfer receiving zone. The plan as it now
exists does not show any relationship to the facts. The
theater owners do not care for the plan because they feel
that the return is too little to support the operation of a
theater. The City did not thoroughly do its planning
homework to determine if their increases were feasible given
the area. The transfer of the theaters' development rights
are viewed by Nederlander and the Times as the sole form of
return for the theaters. The City views the transfer of
development rights as a panacea for the theaters'
problems. The transfer of devlopment rights should be but
one part of a plan to aid in the revitilization of the
Broadway stage. As it appears today, the plan will be
utilized by a limited number of theater owners.
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IX. The Issues of Transfer of Development Rights
A. Are the benefits of the transfer enjoyed equally
by all?
Many issues surround the question of transfer of
development rights. Regardless of the system employed
(adjacency, receiving zone, or free zone) questions arise as
to whether transfer of development rights is the correct
option to choose. When planners or preservationists decide
to utilize a transfer program, it must be the best choice
according to the given situation. The planning results
could affect future generations. But at the time of the
transfer, the question exists: does everyone benefit from
the transfer? The removal of air rights in one area surely
affects the receivers due to the receivers ' loss of light
and air and strain upon existing services. In the case of
an adjacent transfer, the parties subject to the results are
the same: the benefits of the transfer are readily
accessible to those affected by the transfer at the
outset. Benefits such as the retention of scale and light
and air are just to name a few. In the case of the
receiving zone system, if the receiving zone is in close
proximity to the preservation zone, again one can readily
discern that both parties are beneficiaries to the
transfer's best results. However, if the receiving zone is
some distance away or the system in place is of the free
zone type, the benefits for those encumbered by the
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increased bulk are not as clearly defined.
For example, the City of New York may decide that it is
in its best interest to preserve important midtown
landmarks. The City decides that it will create a special
Fifth Avenue Landmarks Preservation zone, restricting the
amount of density which would be allowed in the area. As a
means of compensation, the City approves a transfer of
development rights program. However, the receiving zone
for the rights is the Upper West Side, an area experiencing
a boom in residential real estate. On the surface it seems
that the City has made a good decision: the landmarks are
saved, the developers are compensated, and the people
yearning to live on the Upper West Side are happy. But the
result of such a system creates such towers as Television
City. Do the residents of the neighbourhood derive any
benefit from the transfer? They lose precious light and
air, their support services are strained, and mass transit,
slowly recovering on the Upper West Side, is pushed to its
limit. The benefits for the residents of the area are few
while those in midtown are great: less congestion, light,
air, aesthetic environment. While it is true that the
argument could be made that the preservation zone is readily
acceptable, there are other possible examples where this is
not the case. A true-life example occurred when the City
proposed that in order to alleviate the congestion and
high-level density of the Wall Street area, air rights for
the Customs House could be transferred across New York Bay
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and to the Staten Island greenbelt. The benefits for the
residents of Staten Island are far less clear than the
earlier example.
In order for a transfer of development rights program
to survive public challenge, the public must first see that
it is beneficial to them. Costonis states in Space Adrift
that the public is behind the preservation movement. (160)
I must agree. The preservation movement in the United
States has grown immensely in the past decade. People
across the nation are no longer blindly accepting change, as
the challenge over the Columbus Circle site in New York
attests. The ideas of scale and human environment are
important to the man on the street. To allow a transfer
program to spawn a building such as Columbus Center is to
doom it to failure. Preservation in the United States came
from the action of its citizens; they should all benefit
from it.
The South Street Seaport District has most certainly
allowed for the benefits of density transfers to be enjoyed
by all. The movement of the development rights to the
immediate south along Water Street has created a park of
light and air that is heavily used by tourists. (161)
South Street Seaport is an oasis in the desert that is lower
Manhattan. Sadly, the historic buildings that now provide
so many with open space in an area with a serious dirth of
any kind of open, light space would not have survived and
the area would have been further packed with nothing but
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banal, characterless plazas such as one finds along Sixth
Avenue that only benefit the developer with increased height
for more return on his investment. For proof of the
benefits of this successful transfer program, one must visit
the Seaport on a warm spring day.
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B. What is the role of transfer of development
rights in zoning and planning?
A concern of important dimensions is the role of
transfer of development rights in regards to municipalities
'
rights to set zoning limitations. Zoning is the one, if
not the major, tool available to a municipality to carry out
its goal of providing a safe and healthy environment for its
citizenry. Part of this healthy environment is the ability
for light and air to penetrate down to the streets.
Transfer of development rights adds density to areas that
have already been zoned by the municipality to an acceptable
height. To add to that height, in some instances, would
create intolerable conditions of stale air and darkness at
midday.
The transfer of development rights program is to be
viewed as part of existing zoning, not as a separate unit.
In order for this to occur, a municipality that is
considering a transfer program must have a workable
municipal plan. Without a plan, the results could be an
over extension of services, poor utilization of existing
conditions or services, economic displacement for the
residents, and the possible destruction of the
municipality's tax base. The municipality must do its
planning homework.
The implementation of a transfer of development rights
program requires long term planning for the municipality.
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The municipality must be able to target areas for growth or
recognize growth in particular areas at its incipient
stage. In other words, the municipality must recognize
that a particular area is under -zoned for the development
pressures placed upon it. It is legally unwise for a
municipality to down zone a potential growth area because,
if there is a municipal bank, the municipality is open to
charges of forcing developers to buy air rights that were
once available without charge.
.
One area that seems to have been able to combine a
transfer of development rights program with incipient real
estate growth is Georgetown area in Washington D.C. The
Georgetown proposal involved the preservation of the area's
riverfront. The plan for Georgetown recognized the
construction of the Washington, D.C. Metro. The City
Council realized that density increases would be necessary
as businesses relocated along the new service corridor.
Instead of increasing the allowable density along the Metro
Line, -che unused yet allowable development rights from the
riverfront were earmarked for transfer to the receiving zone
along the path of the subway.
The long term view employed in Georgetown allowed for
the implementation of a transfer of development rights
program. When density increases were realized to be an
imminent necessity, existing zoning densities were found
verses the creation of new density allocations. The
creation of new density would have solved one problem, but
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would have done nothing to protect the historic waterfront
and the overall amount of density in Georgetown would have
increased, destroying an aspect of its character. The
various elements of a municipal plan must work in concert.
With the implementation of the transfer of development
rights program and the utilization of these rights,
Washington, D.C. has satisfied its need for density while
also fulfilling its goals for preservation.
Transfer of development rights must fit into the
existing plan or the plan must be altered to coordinate the
actions of its elements. The increased density can be
incorporated into the cityscape if the plan provides for
these increases. Cities regularly grant variances for
building height and bulk, often without clear integration
with the existing municipal plan. Transfer of development
rights, by their very nature, need to be planned. Since
they move development rights, transferred rights are a more
controlled form of zoning enhancement. There are many
levels of control that the transfer of development rights
must pass before their eventual implementation. Also,
transfer of development rights, if the system allows, moves
bulk to predetermined sites, again controlling growth in a
designated area. The transfer of development rights does
not undercut existing zoning. They are a method of
controlled updating and amending of the existing municipal
code
.
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C. The municipal development rights bank
Throughout the analysis, one can see the role the
development rights bank plays: the South Street Seaport and
Fred F. French are two such examples. The municipal bank,
either through its absence or presence, must be a
significant feature of a transfer of development rights
program. First, we must address the question of the bank's
structure: is the bank municipal or part of the private
sector? Costonis identifies three sources for air rights to
supply the bank. The rights are obtained from both the
public and private sectors and in some instances, utilize
the municipalities legislative abilities. If we are to
follow Costonis 's method of air rights retention, (162) the
third means, acquiring air rights from municipally owned
properties, creates a conflict of interest. A municipality
creates zoning. If the development rights transfer statute
is in the municipal plan, a direct conflict of intent is the
result. To be succinct, the body that creates the the
unused air rights, takes them back to fund the municipal
bank. In theory, if the bank came up short, the city could
rezone its municipal properties to unobtainable, unrealistic
heights to create a large cushion for the bank. The
program as it exists with the South Street Seaport District
seems best suited to avoid changes of conflict of
interest. The reader may remember that in the South Street
Seaport District, the development rights bank was made up of
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a consortium of banks that formerly held mortgages on the
historic properties. By removing the City from the role of
municipal development rights banker, the potential for
conflict and municipal corruption is greatly reduced.
The absence of a development rights bank destroyed the
City's ability to preserve the Tudor City parks in the Fred
F. French case. To reiterate, it was the lack of tangible
value for the development rights that caused the failure of
the transfer. In order for the landmark owner to receive
adequate compensation, they must be able to sell their
rights at market or near market value. This market price
is not necessarily set by the free market. This implies
that the market will at some time purchase the rights. The
role of the development rights bank is to set a fair market
price for these rights, but the bank must also serve as a
repository for as-of-yet unsold rights.
The first feature of the development rights bank is its
role as a price setter for the rights. Its second role is
as a repository. As seen with the South Street Seaport
District, a consortium of private banks released their
mortgages on the historic properties. In return, they
served as the development rights bank and as the rights were
sold, a portion of their cost was used to settle the
forgiven debt. The rights were sold to various designated
sites in the receiving zone. The rights were sold as
needed in the market place. Until the time of the
purchase, the rights remained in a file drawer.
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Commercial banks by their very nature base their loans
and investments on longterm ventures. They can afford to
wait for their return over a longer period of time than a
municipality. The banks' risks are well-planned and
predetermined to the best of their abilities. Their rate
of return on investment, such as from loans, is somewhat
secure and constant, depending on the bank. Also, the
banks' assets are quite substantial. A municipality,
however, is usually not as structured as a bank and does not
plan financially far advance. This is due to the public
and political needs that are absent from a private bank.
The fact there are political and public pressures that exist
in government is all the more reason for the development
rights bank to remain out of public ownership. The
development rights bank requires firm, political commitment.
It is not to be used as a tool for bargaining. Such an
existence would make it a considerable option for developers
in search of increased density or bulk. Also, the bank
would not be subject to political graft. This would be
source of public lack of confidence in the bank and the
city's preservation plan as well. Finally, the money
realized from the sale of development rights should be used
for the landmarks plan. This may include, paying off debts
on landmarks, funds for restoration, buying or condemning
rights for the bank, paying for preservation easements.
There are further elements of the preservation/development
rights program that
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would need funding as well. The bank is not to be seen as
a source for the municipality as a whole. It is not to pay
for the firemen or mass transit. By creating a privately
run development right bank, we sever some aspects of the
preservation program from the city, freeing up precious
municipal resources for other city services.
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D. Is the Transfer of Development Rights Compatible
with the Aims of Preservation?
What most certainly deserves the closest scrutiny is
the use of transferred development rights as a means of
preservation. On the surface, it seems that transferred
development rights are successful: twelve landmark
structures have been saved by this planning method. But is
the result of the transfer of development rights beneficial
for preservation?
The transfer of development rights means that when the
transfer is to an adjacent site, a building of small scale
is sometimes overwhelmed by a neighbour not of zoned size,
but larger. In mid-town Manhattan, one can find landmark
structures of heights under eight stories tall side-by-side
with skyscrapers of heights 30-40 stories tall. Part of
the preservation of a landmark is the preservation of its
scale. While landmarking does not extend to its
non-designated neighbours, when a neighbourhood's scale can
be controlled in an area of high landmark concentration, the
idea of increasing bulk at an adjacent site destroys not
only the scale of the landmark, but the area scale as well.
Scale is best preserved. When a municipality utilizes a
receiving zone system such as the Theater District, density
is moved away from the Core Preservation zone. (163) The
key is to target areas within the zone that are sensative to
the disruption of scale. (164) Again, a municipality's
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general plan must be thorough. If the increase in bulk
which is the result of a transfer are not to cause a
planning disaster, the municipality must be able to
determine how much increase it will allow. New York has
chosen 20 percent overage on the receiving site in a
non-commercial district. This figure is in conjunction
with their ultimate height and bulk limitations. In
Georgetown, the municipal government could determine its
desired pattern of development and height and bulk
limitations. If it was desired, it could raise the
existing zoning to get to its base height; the transfer
rights would raise the building heights to their acceptable
limits. (165)
The preservation of the cityscape is a broader issue.
Increases in bulk and height are not trivial, nor are they
minor. (166) Each increase in height deprives the city's
residents of light and air. A long term view of the
increases must be considered. While one or two increases
are probably harmless in the broad view, the problem is when
the plan is in place for a long period of time and many
transfers have occurred. The net result is a cluster of
tall buildings placing the smaller landmarks in shadow.
South Street Seaport District, for all of its high
qualities, does suffer from this problem. The problem of
dark and long shadows can remain at its present level if the
surrounding area remains at either its present height or the
height as zoned is not changed. The cumulative affect of
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the increased buildings to the south and the already built
to zoned height buildings to the west make the district
darker as the day progresses. In the eyes of most critics,
the benefits of preserving the district hopefully outweigh
the losses. The structures are preserved, but they do
suffer to some extent from their preservation.
An issue embodied in the above paragraph and necessary
to consider is the longterm affect of the transfer of
development rights. In the short term, transferred
development right provide a necessary infusion of cash for
the landmark. Repairs on the landmark can progress. The
landmark can be rehabilitated and modernized in order for it
to reach its highest level of efficiency. In the long
term, transfer of development rights is questionable.
Transfer of development rights is a means of obtaining
economic stability for an urban landmark. But what is
unfeasible about the transfer of development rights is that
their return is unstable and an unsure form of compensation
and therein lies part of their danger when counted upon to
offset financial burden. As a form of payment or
compensation, transferred rights are granted at the time of
sale. It is the responsibility of the seller of the rights
to find a means of steady income from the sale. Part of
the proceeds could be returned to the building to prolong
its economic life, but the return of investment on a
landmark will never be the same as the return on the
redeveloped site. The assumption must be made that those
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who own landmark properties are not in the high scale, fast
paced real estate market with the likes of Donald Trump.
If the building is properly maintained, enjoys a level of
occupancy that is sufficient for the owner to meet his
operating costs and realize a profit, and lower taxes due to
its loss of air rights, the owner can expect to enjoy a
return of 7 to 8 percent return on equity. (167) Added to
the return in interest from the profits of the sale, placed
in a bank at a rate of 8 percent, the return on equity for
the owner of the site is approximately 15 percent. This is
higher than the return on many new buildings. What makes
the transfer of the rights questionable is that not all of
the income is derived from the site: interest rates rise and
fall. The owner of the landmark building must double his
source of profit, thus doubling his risk. The sale of the
air rights may not return enough to allow for sufficient
return of equity to cover the operating expenses of the
building. Insurance rates for older buildings are higher
than those for new buildings. (168)
Adaptive use of the older building may allow for a
greater return. When the older building is part of a new
structure that is adjacent to the site, it can be assumed
that some profits from the new structure will help offset
the higher operating costs of the older structure.
However, when the rights are transferred to a site that is
in a receiving zone and not part of the original site, the
chances for some sort of economic link between the new and
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the old are unlikely. At South Street Seaport, the entire
preservation zone can be seen as a singular entity and the
receiving zone as another, adjacent entity. In affect, the
system in place at the Seaport is similar to rather large
adjacent lots. Owners in the District would not relay
information about their returns, citing confidentiality.
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E. Is the Transfer of Development Rights
Compensation
The concept of compensation is central to the issue of
transfer of development rights. Before the 1978 Supreme
Court decision in Penn Central, transfer of development
rights, it appears, were not considered as a means of
compensation on a national level. The threat of
legislative taking had been challenged in the courts, but
solutions involving transferring rights or even less
sophisticated means of land control were usually not
discussed. The Supreme Court determined that transferable
development rights were a valuable asset, mitigated any
financial loss for the Terminal, and countered the extent of
the legislative action. (165)
Before the courts can begin to determine if the
transfer of development rights serves as compensation, it
must determine if a taking has occurred. In Penn Central ,
we see that the Court determined that a taking had not
occurred, therefore the air rights could be used to help
determine the severity of the government's action. The
Court stated plainly that the rights may not have fulfilled
their definition of compensation if a taking had occurred.
While stating that the rights had a value, for Fifth
Amendment purposes, that value may not have been enough.
The theoretical value of the rights is unchallenged. It is
their actual market value that is disputable. Similar to
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land, the value of development rights fluctuates with the
market. But the difference is in the fact that the
development rights are not tangible and subject to more than
just the economic whims of the market. If the market is
down, their value is not to be realized at all. What one
purchases with development rights is potential.
In Fred F. French , the question of the transfer of
development rights is answered. The question is: Does the
transfer of development rights serve as a means of
compensation that satisfy the conditions of the Fifth
Amendment? In Fred F. French
, the Court of Appeals found
the fact that the TDRs were not linked to specific receiving
parcels rendered them so abstract and uncertain that they
could not be treated as just compensation. The development
rights of the parks were valuable, but not adequate to
compensate for the complete loss of the property's
profitablity. Their lack of adequacy was due in part to
the action. But also, the unpredictable value of the
rights, as mentioned above, fails to allow the rights to
serve as a source of compensation.
A transfer of development rights program with some sort
of development rights bank would validate any compensation
option. The seller of the rights would be guaranteed some
sort of tangible return. He would have the option of an
immediate sale on the market at a negotiated price or sale
to the bank at a predetermined, yet competitive, price.
The bank price would reflect the surety of the deal while
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the market price would reflect the risks of the market
place
.
A central feature of the New York program is the
establishment of a trust fund for the maintenance of the
landmark. This is figured into the cost of the development
rights. The trust fund, as seen with the Theater report,
can be created to do more than just fund maintenance.
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X
.
New York City and the Transfer of Development Rights
A. Recommendations for change
New York has a transfer program that is active, working
at South Street Seaport, Amster Yard, the old First Precinct
Police Station and most recently the Theater District.
Each of these examples has merits, but it must be remembered
that when the program fails, chances are that the landmark
will be demolished or severely altered. The New York
Program, while retaining important features, needs to change
to make the transfer of development rights the best possible
means of saving landmarks while allowing for growth. The
following recommendations are made to improve the program
and preserve the City's landmarks. The city must first
make development rights transfers more competitive with
zoned lot mergers. Second, it must become flexible in
adjacency requirements. Third, it must write legislation
which would enable it to create a development rights bank.
Transferring development rights is less popular than
zoning bonuses or the zoned lot merger. If the City is
committed to preservation, it must make transfer of
development rights more competitive. In a tight area such
as Wall Street or central midtown, transfer of development
rights will probably be effective. Zoning bonuses do not
work well on lots less than a quarter of a block in size.
Transfer of development rights could be the answer if the
allow for increases in lot coverage. Transferred
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development rights are more profitable to a developer than a
zoning bonus as long as the development rights can be
utilized to regularize the shape of the building for greater
efficiency. (167) The transfer of development rights has
been used for additional lot coverage at South Street
Seaport. The higher a building is, the more floor space
that must be turned over for mechanical use. (170) The
increase in the coverage allows for more rentable space in
buildings built upon narrow lots that would normally require
them to step back and thus diminish floor size. Handled
with care and in concert with a well developed plan, the
bulk increases will not impact as severely on the cityscape.
The idea of adjacency as embodied in the New York
program appears to be an invitation to planning excesses.
Buildings of small scale can be overwhelmed by adjacent tall
skyscrapers. To transfer the rights away from the site can
permit the building to be viewed in an uncluttered
environment. The scale of not only the building but of the
immediate vicinity can be saved as well. While this is not
an aspect of a landmark that can be controlled, the City can
do its role by limiting the amount of air rights that can be
transferred to an adjacent site regardless of the use of the
building. By allowing for transfer to occur only at
adjacent sites, the City has made the rights more difficult
to sell by limiting the options afforded to the landmark
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owner. By allowing for the transfer of the rights through
a district, the owner has that many more purchasers for his
right accessible to him.
A municipality can employ both options: a receiving
zone and an adjacent site. Development rights transfers to
adjacent sites should be limited to a certain percentage of
the rights allowable for the adjacent site. Currently, the
New York City program allows for the receiving site to
increase overage by 20 percent in non-commercial low density
areas. This should be an across-the-board limitation for
all adjacent sites. An adjacent site commercial or
non-commercial, high or low density can be designated to
receive either part or all of the 20 percent allotment of
the unused rights that is allowed to be transferred to
adjacent sites. If any remainds of the 20 percent, it can
be transferred to other adjacent sites. The remaining 80
percent of the rights can either stay with the building and
remain unused, be sold to a site away from the landmark lot,
or be sold to the development rights bank. To prevent
abuse, the 80 percent transfer to non-adjacent lots should
be flexible. All or part of the 80 percent can be
transferred to a high density commercial district and in a
low density, non-commercial district the greatest overage
increase would be 20 percent per lot.
The development rights bank is the third feature
necessary for the full use of development rights transfers
in New York. The South Street Seaport district used a
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private development rights bank and the program has been
successful in saving landmarks in the District. The bank
would buy and sell rights, regulate prices, and importantly,
preserve landmarks through condemnation of landmark rights.
Condemnation could be made through the city acting either on
behalf of the bank or independent of it. The development
rights bank as observed earlier would be best served in
private hands. However, the potential for conflict lies in
the fact that municipal rights and duties will be handed
over to a private body. A system such as one finds at
South Street is fine, but for the City to create a bank each
time it is needed when lend an air of temporariness and
instability to the bank. The features that made the bank
so attractive and plausible in the private sector must be
utilized in the public sector bank. The risks of municipal
impropriety and corruption are present and it will be up to
the development community to watchdog this political unit
that is in place to work with them.
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XI
. Conclusion
The transfer of development rights is a tool that
enables urban landmarks to become economically competitive.
However, the concept of the transfer of development rights
has many challenges and hurdles that it must surmount in
order for any program of this kind to be successful. The
municipality that wishes to employ such a system must insure
that it is prepared both from a legal and planning
perspective. Without this preparatory work, the
municipality's transfer program and the landmarks it intends
to preserve are endangered.
The preservation movement in the United States has gone
from private, special interest oriented groups to public
policy and, with the transfer of development rights, back to
the private realm. The transfer of development rights is a
way to shift the responsibility of landmark retention from
the municipal to the private. Landmarks are saved by
private investment.
Our legal system is based upon a heritage which spans
over half a millenium. Property is one of the more
important aspects of our legal system. Laws have been
written to protect our lives, freedom, and our property;
this means our land rights as well as our material goods.
The protection of this right is embodied in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
However, limitations of the use of property in defence of
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the common good or what has been called the general welfare,
began with the first zoning ordinance in 1916. The City of
New York passed this ordinance that restricted the height
and bulk of new construction. The right of a municipality
to legislate land use controls was upheld in the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v .
Ambler Realty Co. »
The preservation of our built environment began in
earnest in the late 1960s. Legislation such as the
National Historic Preservation Act was able to become a
reality due to Supreme Court decisions such as United States
V. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co. and Berman v . Parker .
While not directly dealing with historic preservation, these
decisions have been applied to preservation cases to foster
a preservation ethic. In 1978, the Supreme Court's Penn
Central decision formulated a procedure to determine the
extent of legislative taking. This decision, while
specifically dealing with the use of land and the right of a
municipality to legislate land use controls, has greatly
advanced the legal cause of historic preservation.
A central feature to the legislation of land use is the
"taking": the taking of property is the overextension of a
legislation. When the courts have determined that
regulation is so extensive as to destroy a property owner's
use of his property, a taking has occurred. The taking of
property requires compensation to the owner.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is the classic
definition of a legislative taking. It determined the
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extent to which the Kohler Act destroyed the Company's
ability to mine coal profitably. Also determined was the
extent to which the general public was affected by the
subsidence of the surface.
The Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
decision in 1978 re-evaluated the Pennsylvania Coal
doctrine. In a four step procedure, Justice Brennan
refuted the claims of legislative taking asserted by the
railroad. His procedure influenced judicial determination
in similar circumstances. The four steps are determination
of the legitimacy of the property claim, Fifth Amendment
application, evaluation of the legislation, and lastly,
determine the extent of the legislative action upon the
property and diminution in value and balance the the
objectives of the legislation and the result to determine if
a taking had occurred.
In the past year, two cases have come before the
Supreme Court that have dealt with the issue of taking:
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association y. DeBenedictus and
Nollan V. California Coastal Commission . These cases have
utilized the procedure of weighing affect of legislation on
the property owner verses the needs of the general public
and how well the legislation in question fulfills that
need. In Keystone Bituminous Coal , the court reaffirmed
its stance of viewing different layers of property as an
ensemble and not as individual parts of an owner's site.
In Nollan, the court continued the practice of determining
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the extent of a legislative action on the property owner and
its ability to serve the public.
Once the court determines that a taking has occurred,
compensation must be paid to the owner. This is to be the
fair market value for the property. In Penn Central , the
Supreme Court determined that a taking had not occurred and
the presence of the Terminal's valuable air rights mitigated
any financial burden placed upon the railroad by landmark
designation. The Supreme court stated clearly that had
they determined that a taking had occurred, the air rights
alone may not have been adequate compensation. This was a
theoretical determination. In the New York State Court of
Appeals case, Fred F. French Investment Co. v. City of New
York , the Court determined that a taking had occurred. The
air rights that the City allowed to be transferred to the
midtowm business district were valuable, but they did not
equally compensate the owner for the extent to which his
land was taken. The Court also stated that had there been
a guarantee of their sale, a similar conclusion may not have
been reached. The transfer of development rights program
as it exists in New York City does not a permanent transfer
of development rights bank and will surely see a repeat of
the Fred F . French case in similar circumstances. The Penn
Central decision should be regarded as further warning that,
legally, the use of the transfer of development rights as a
source of compensation is a risky project.
The Chicago Plan was developed by John J. Costonis.
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It is his attempt to synthesize a complete transfer of
development rights program for the city of Chicago. The
plan could be utilized in any urban center. The Plan
attempts to make urban landmarks economically competitive
with the zoned potential for the site. Costonis attempts
to reconcile the Plan and its transfer of development rights
mechanism with existing zoning and land use practices.
Practices such as zoning bonuses and lot mergers are
discussed in relation to transfers. The use of the
transfer of development rights is seen as a sounder means of
zoning augmentation: the net increase in urban density is
zero as bulk and density are not added to the existing
regulation, but moved from one site to another within the
existing zoning fabric.
The Chicago Plan consists of four elements: the
incentive package, the preservation restriction, the
development rights transfer district, and the municipal
development rights bank. The incentive package determines
the economic needs and value of the site as a result of
designation. The preservation restriction provides for the
continued existence of the site from which the air rights
came. The development rights transfer district is the area
designated by the municipality to receive the transferred
rights. The municipal development rights bank is the
municipal agency that stores, sells, and determines the
price for development rights. These four elements work in
concert, creating a system which in theory successfully
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transfers development rights. They keep the system from
being abused or from density increases being haphazardly
granted.
The transfer of development rights program in New York
City contains some of these elements in varying degrees
according to the situation. The sites reviewed were Amster
Yard, South Street Seaport District and Tudor City. Amster
Yard was one of the first transfer to take place in the
City. The rights were transferred to an adjacent site.
There was not a development rights transfer district for
Amster Yard. The buildings of Amster Yard were saved, but
in conclusion, it appears that it terms of scale and
preservation of light and air, Amster Yard fails. The
buildings are overwhelmed by its larger neighbour. South
Street Seaport District is the closest to the Chicago Plan
with a transfer district, preservation restriction and a
development rights bank. South Street also is the most
successful of the three. The buildings are preserved as is
the general scale of the neighbourhood. Though the area
tends to be dark towards mid-day, the general character of
the area is preserved. The area's benefits are shared by
not only those who work in the area, but tourists from
throughout the world. The development rights bank is
private, allowing the City to be freed from the worries of
long-term outlay of cash. The banks that held mortgages on
the historic buildings were repayed from proceeds of the
rights sales. Tudor City shows how the City attempted to
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preserve open space by offering a development rights
transfer to an owner. The owner refused and the City lost
its case in Court. The City's development rights transfer
program as it exists on paper does not work. It is only
when the program is tailored to a particular situation,
using the existing code as a firm foundation, as at South
Street Seaport that one finds a truly successful program.
Economically, the transfer of development rights is an
additional cost to an owner. The transfer of development
rights cost an additional $84 per square foot in one
example. But in comparison to zoned lot mergers and zoning
bonuses, the transfer of rights is competitive. With the
zoned lot merger, one has the acquisition of the additional
landmark site to consider, plus full restoration and
renovation costs of the landmark if it is to be part of the
new project. If there are buildings to be demolished, this
is an additional cost. Also, the cost of this demolition
is not deductible from the cost of the project. With the
zoning bonus, rental space is lost at the expense of
providing open public space. This ultimately raises the
cost per square foot as well.
Three types of transfer systems exist: the adjacent,
the receiving, and the free. The adjacent system is when
the rights are transferred to a site adjacent to the
landmark site. This system can result in buildings which
overwhelm their smaller, landmark neighbours. The program
currently allows for the full transfer of a building's
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development rights in a high density commercial district.
At a site such as Grand Central, the Terminal could be
dominated by a neighbour that uses all of its development
rights. The receiving zone system is either where the
receiving zone overlaps the area of landmark concentration
or is removed from the core area. The overlap system has
the potential for abuse similar to the adjacency system,
unless some prohibition about adjacent transfers is
specified. The removed receiving zone with predetermined
sites within the zone seems to work best, satisfying the
needs of develop to increase zoning while keeping those
increases away from the area wished to be preserved.
Amenities such as low-scale, light, air, and sufficient use
of services are the result. The free zone is a receiving
zone with no specific site -designated for the reception of
transferred rights. This system seems the least
successful, as it was one of the factors in the Fred F
.
French decision. If there exists a development rights
bank, the free zone would be a more successful system
legally, but from a planning perspective, the municipality
would be neglecting its responsibility to provide a decent
environment for its inhabitants. The result of increasing
bulk is not acceptable everywhere.
Many issues arise from a transfer of development rights
program. The first issue is whether or not the benefits of
the transfer such as retention of light and air and scale
are enjoyed by all. If the receiving zone for the
105

transferred rights is too far from the source of the rights,
a court could determine that the benefits are for only a
few. To prevent such a charge, a municipality must insure
that the program protects the rights and welfare of all its
citizens
.
The second issue is: does transfer of development
rights work with planning and zoning? The transfer of
development rights must work with existing zoning and
plans. The role of a transfer program is to protect
landmarks while enhancing the effectiveness of the code.
Neither the existing code or the transfer program are to
work against each other.
The third issue is whether or not a development rights
bank is necessary. The result of Fred F. French
illustrates that the presence of such a bank will enhance
the preservation objectives of a municipality. The
existence of a development rights bank at South Street
allowed for both the banks and the preservationists to be
happy, allowing each group to get what it wanted from the
program. The developer in the receiving zone were also
able to obtain valuable rights from the bank which allowed
them to build more efficient and thus more profitable
buildings on their sites.
Transfer of development rights and its compatibility
with preservation is the fourth issue. While the transfer
of development rights does allow for the economic survival
of urban landmarks, it does have a detrimental affect
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on smaller landmarks. Areas affected are the relationship
of the landmark to its neighbours, the preservation of the
cityscape, and the preservation of the buildings use.
The final issue is whether or not the transfer of
development rights provides adequate compensation for an
owner if a taking has occurred. Reviewing both Fred F.
French and Penn Central , one can see that the transfer of
development rights is a risky prospect as compensation. If
a development rights bank is created, the rights may be
adequate, but this has yet to determined. Under the
decision of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , the Court held that if
there is a taking, compensation must be paid. Some sort of
additional monies will be needed to pay for the long term
affects of the taking. If there is a development rights
bank, additional rights may be added to a site for sale, but
either from this source or from cash sources, the
municipality would suffer financially.
Three things are recommended for the New York City
transfer of development rights program in order for it to
work more effectively. The City must make the transfer of
development rights more competitive with the zoned lot
merger. The transfer of develpment rights should be
designated to be used for increases in lot coverage. The
City also must more flexible in its ad;]acency requirements.
The City must determine what is adjacent and what is not and
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move towards either an area wide or block wide transfer
scheme. Also requirements how much air rights may be
transferred to an adjacent site must be reconsidered.
Thirdly, the City must considered creating a development
rights bank that would effectively preserve its landmarks.
At this time, the transfer of development rights
program in New York is at a crucial point. The program has
success and failures in its past. It is time for the City
to plan for the future. The transfer of development rights
can work to bring about a change in the way our old
buildings are seen. The landmark building can finally make
an attempt to stand on its own, not only within the realm of
architectural significance and planning, but in the market
place as well.
In conclusion, there are certain evaluations that can
be derived from this analysis. The transfer of development
rights will not always further the goals of preservation, it
is not a long-term solution to the greater problem of
preservation of a structure and its use, preservation of
individual sites to create light and air parks is
detrimental to broader preservation goals, and as a means of
solving legal problems, the transfer of development rights
is a risky utilization.j
One must realize when they enter the field of
preservation that there will always be those who are opposed
to the ideals and goals of preservation. The reasons are
sometimes economic, but they are usually of a broader issue
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regarding the use of one's home and the sanctity of that
home. These are concepts from the constitution. Economic
assistance such as the ability to transfer one's air rights
are attractive to these individuals. One such example is
the theater owners in New York's mid-town. Over twenty
theaters were designated landmarks last year. With that
designation came the right to transfer the theaters' unused
rights to sites within a special mid-town zoning district.
Owners of the theaters such as the Shubert and Nederlander
organizations have fought the designations from the start,
citing both constitutional and economic reasons. The
owners have recently filed suit in a New York court to
overturn their designations, stating that the designations
are an economic burden. They can no longer alter the
interiors to suit the needs of a given production because
the bureaucratic process increases the turnover time for a
theater, the necessary replacement cost for features removed
to accommadate a production are too expensive, and the
development rights do not provide adequate relief for the
theaters because it does not meet the costs of running a
theater profitably.
As can be seen, the owners are not going to utilize
their right of transferability. They are simply opposed to
the idea of designation and the transfer of their rights
does not alter their way of thinking. Since the
designation of the theaters, at least three projects in
various stages of development have utilized rights from the
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theaters. Certainly the designations and zoning insentives
from the city have unleashed a flury of building activity
along Broadway. However, regardless of this boom and the
apparent willingness of developers to utilize those rights
for taller and bulkier buildings, the theater owners want
their designations revoked. Try as we may in the
preservation field, we must realize that the transfer of
development rights will not appeal to everyone and they are
not a panacea for all of our preservation woes.
Individual transfers such as those that do and will
occur in the special theater district do not provide a long
term solution for preservation of our historic structures.
This is especially true when there is some restrictive use
as to the future employment of the site. This only serves
to exerscerbate the problem of saving the landmark and can
be viewed as a significant factor in the eventual decline of
the structure.
The problem that exists in the theater district is one
of unprof itability . The City has determined that various
theaters are worth saving in the mid-town west area. These
theaters have valuable air rights. The air rights are to
be sold and the theater and its owner will receive a quick
injection of cash. On the surface it may appear that the
theater is saved. However, what is to happen the next time
a theater is in financial trouble? I do not see how the
transfer of development rights component used in the theater
district will provide for the long term survival of those
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buildings. The presence of a trust fund is encouraging, but if
the financial troubles of the theater industry continue at their
present level, it is difficult to understand how the fund will be
able to rescue all of the theaters. The singular use of the
transfer of development rights is no longer an option.
The use of air rights transfers in the theater district is a
political tool utilized by the current mayoral administration to
placate a segment of its constituency. When the financial
problems of the theaters becomes insurmountable as they surely
will, the Koch administrationwill be long gone. The Koch
administration has not analyzed the uderlying causes for the
degeneration of the theater in New York. While the changes in
use, character, and demographics of mid-town west are surely a
factor, one must also acknowledge that it now costs between $40
and $50 to see a show on Broadway. The developer is the sole
enemy of the theater. The actors who so vocally fought for
designation after the destruction of the Helen Hayes and Morosco
theaters failed to recognize the causes for the destruction that
exist within their community. Union wages, unnecessary
production staff, high salaries for feature performers have all
contributed to the demise of the theater. Very few
theater-goers seem to be surprised when told of a production cost
in excess of one million dollars. The prohibitive rates
demanded by Actors Equity have condemned the Lyceum Theater to
continued darkness as the Vivian Beaumont Theater-in-Exile
program seems unlikely to be realized. (171)
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The preservation community sadly followed the administration
in its praises of an evaluation that did not explore all the
pertainant facts. The Theater Advisory Council's report on the
theaters does not question itself, the theater community. It is
time for the theater community to examine itself and not
potentially destroy a preservation/planning tool that has had
such successes as the South Street Seaport.
The idea that the transfer of development rights creates
light and air parks over individual landmarks in congested urban
centers is false. In actuality, the ability of the landmark to
successful be part of the streetscape is destroyed. This is not
to mean that we are to sacrifice our low-scale landmarks.
However, in the future it may be beneficial to create zones of
hard and soft preservation. By intigrating a system of
development rights transfers in to the idea of hard and soft
zones of preservation, development next to not only landmarks but
whole historic districts can be controlled to protect broader,
more liveable areas of light and air. This does not exist in
the present. The transfer of development rights program in New
York can generally be viewed as a failure in this respect,
placing such elegant buildings as the First Precinct Police
Station in a forest of behemouths. And such historic districts
as Brooklyn Heights find their very boaders victim of tall
building encroachment.
A new threat exists along the waterfront of the City. The
Hudson River waterfront is experiencing development pressures as
the success of the New Jersey Gold Coast and Battery Park City
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has developers and municipalities re-evaluating the potential of
these long forgotten areas. Historic districts which border the
waterfront such as Greenwhich Village and Soho run the risk of
being hidden behind a wall of buildings built at as-of right
zoning, augmented by bonuses. To surround historic districts
with areas of softer preservation restrictions would prevent such
an occcurence. These soft areas are to be receiving zones for
the landmark's or district's development rights. The closer to
the site in question, the less development rights allowed to be
received on that site. The City would be able to control the
amount of development that would occur in these high growth rate
areas. Instead of creating mediocre shafts of light that
isolate a landmark or hemming in a district by tall buildings,
broader areas of light and air can be realized. Landmarks and
districts can be integrated into the existing streetscape and
cityscape and vice versa. The present practice of historic
districts being encapsulated by tall neighbours creates a sense
of disruptive shock as one entires the preservation zone. This
is then followed by a sense of appreciation for the qualities of
the district. While this practice distinctly sets the area
apart as someplace special, it is detrimental to the city as a
whole. The city is to be viewed as a fabric, say a quilt.
Each square has its own distinct pattern yet it is clear that it
is part of a greater entity. The transfer of development
rights, moving rights from hard preservation zones to soft
preservation zones, would allow the City to control the impact
development has on historic districts and their adjoining
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communities. The City would ensure that there is sufficient
open space and building setbacks for not only the landmarks and
districts to retain open, airy qualities, but the City as a whole
as well
.
The ability to transfer development rights is a power that
can be used to create an urban environment for all. It can be
used to preserve our past while aiding in the construction of our
future. Many in the preservation field are short-sighted,
seeing the immediate preservation of a landmark or a district as
the goal and the ability of that landmark or of that area to
survive in to the next five or ten years from now is either
forgotten or never considered. The use of a transfer option
within a preservation area and in conjunction with other planning
efforts and ideas will allow an area to not only survive in
perpetuity
,
but to continue giving something back to the
community and the city at large.
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